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Chapter I: Introduction 
Over the last decades, and especially in the wake of the dramatic events of September 
11, 2001 (9/11), the role and requirements for western intelligence services has 
undergone a revolution. The terrorist attacks in the US, Madrid, London, as well as 
some fifty other planned but averted attacks triggered a massive political response in 
the western world and clearly demonstrated the need to focus on intelligence (Holme, 
2009:172). Intelligence does not operate in a vacuum. It is shaped by the nature of the 
threats and the environment in which it operates (Campbell, 2013: 45). Accordingly, 
the intelligence services received increased resources and powers in order to 
effectively cope with an increasingly complex security environment. In general terms, 
these developments have been similar across many western countries, Norway 
including (Whelan, 2012: Hammerlin, 2010:14). 
 
1.1.Questions and objectives 
This thesis sets out to identify the requirements for modern intelligence organizations 
in a new security environment, and the ability of the Norwegian Police Security 
Service (NPSS) to adapt accordingly. The study raises two interrelated questions with 
the objective to describe organizational developments and explore possible 
explanations for change or continuity within the NPSS. 
 
 
 
1.2.Key findings 
Through a close examination of relevant primary and secondary sources, the study 
finds that the NPSS has responded to the new security environment with mixed 
achievements. The service has over the last decade taken considerable steps to attain 
broader, multidisciplinary expertize and to become more open and transparent toward 
the society. Meanwhile, it is indicated that the service is not sufficiently proactive, and 
that the level of communication with decision-makers and cooperation with other 
(1) How has the NPSS responded to the changes in the security environment? 
(2) What key mechanisms can explain change or continuity within the NPSS? 
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actors is not at the level suggested by the new security environment. The identified key 
mechanisms for change and continuity indicate that external correctives, leadership, 
and changes in the threat scenario, all represent central drivers for development within 
the NPSS. The identified barriers for change seem largely related to the fact that the 
NPSS is a restricted organization with accordingly high demands for confidentiality. 
This implies that the NPSS, in contrast to other public organizations, is not subject to 
the same correctives and continuous evaluation from the society. This is found to have 
several adverse consequences for the ability to adapt in accordance with the security 
environment. Furthermore, as several of the identified key mechanisms are closely 
related to well-known ideas within organizational theory, it is argued that a future 
study from this perspective carries potential to produce highly valuable findings with 
regard to development within the NPSS and intelligence organizations in general. 
 
Having presented some of these principal insights, the remainder of this chapter aims 
to prepare the research stage by outlining the background, limitations and central 
concepts of the study. 
 
1.3.Background 
At the end of the Cold War in 1989, many initially expected it to revert into a more 
modest role. For several years, the “peace dividend” served to cut intelligence 
expenditures in Western states, resulting that many agencies were significantly 
downsized (Campbell, 2013:46; Sejersted, 2005:122-123). Voices in certain Western 
parliaments even proposed the abolition of intelligence, or to merge its functions into 
other institutions of government (Schreier, 2007:25). In Norway, the Police 
Surveillance Service (former name of the NPSS) was also deliberately downscaled, 
resulting that the number of personnel in the districts nearly halved (Holme, 
2009:171). 
 
Reforms were also introduced in many western countries with aim of making 
intelligence more accountable. During the days of the Cold War, the political and 
administrative climate typically saw a broad consensus that vital national interests 
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were best served by leaving the agencies to themselves (Sejersted, 2005:122-123). 
This was now changing, and with the disappearance of the one major threat and 
enemy, the post-Cold War climate invited to a more open and meaningful debate about 
the intelligence services and their extensive secrecy (Mevik & Huus-Hansen, 
2007:144). New light was shed upon previously eclipsed intelligence communities and 
numerous critical debates fostered a widespread public feeling that the time was ripe 
for a major examination of the shrouded business of intelligence (Sejersted, 2005:122-
123).  
 
Although the 90s was a decade marked by substantial debate concerning the future 
role of intelligence, in Norway and in Western states in general, it never seemed likely 
that intelligence would revert to a peripheral role in national decision-making. The 
new world proved to be more complex than the previous, characterized by diverse and 
swiftly changing threats - which no longer understandable through the uniform prism 
of Soviet competition. New approaches to national security were surfacing - 
broadening the perspectives on threats and blurring their previous boundaries. 
Governments found themselves in more need of information than perhaps ever before 
and intelligence budgets gradually started increasing. A major transformation was in 
progress – a transformation which materialized rapidly with the al-Qaeda led attacks 
on 9/11 (Herman, 2005:ix, 201; Herman, 2009:341; Omand, 2010:10). 
 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 marked the beginning of a period in 
international politics characterized by increased uncertainty and a higher level of 
threat (PST, 2002, own translation). 
 
Western intelligence services had not yet fully digested the end of the Cold War when 
the impact of international terrorism became horrifyingly clear. Already it was obvious 
that new organizational structures would be necessary to replace those focused on the 
Soviet bloc, and the attacks on the US added extreme urgency to demands for 
intelligence reform (Strategic Policy Issue, 2008:33). For several reasons, the attacks 
of 9/11 represented a watershed for intelligence organizations.  
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First, although al-Qaeda’s capabilities were previously known, the nature of these 
specific attacks had not been anticipated (Lowenthal, 2009:25). The organization had a 
vision which pointed back to the golden age of Islam, rather than forward to something 
modern. Still, their methods of attack, extensive use of the internet, and global system 
to fund operations, could hardly be described as medieval or old-fashioned. In fact, the 
threats of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin-Landen to use Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) made the organization a very modern threat, and one that could not be dealt 
with by the traditional means of containment and deterrence which developed during 
the Cold War (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2008:83). The attack was planned and financed 
from different locations than where it happened, and it was executed by people who 
had received flying lessons in the country which they were attacking. In many ways, 
the attack represented a new kind of terrorist threat – one which had attuned itself to 
exploit modern technological developments. The organization of al-Qaeda had a 
global reach with affiliates in many countries and the network operated across national 
borders, thus exploiting the vulnerabilities of the globalized society (St.prp. nr. 56, 
2001-2002; 22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:49).  
 
Second, although al-Qaeda’s willingness to attack US targets had been amply 
demonstrated in earlier attacks on western interests, and although there had been 
extensive investigation into the performance of US intelligence prior to the 2001-
attacks, no agencies were in fact able to point up the intelligence that could have led to 
a precise understanding of al-Qaeda’s plans (Lowenthal, 2009:26). Considering that 
the foremost objective of intelligence is, after all, to keep track of threats that are 
capable of endangering the nation, 9/11 clearly represents an intelligence failure 
(Lowenthal, 2009:2). The immediate aftermath of the attacks therefore saw widespread 
political support and demand for strengthening the capacities for intelligence and 
surveillance in Western countries, all as part of the new “global war against terrorism”. 
Understandably, these developments were particularly strong in the US, prompting 
reorganizations and increased authorities for intelligence services (EOS-utvalget, 
2002:4; Lowenthal, 2009:25). Still, although at a different scale, similar shifts were 
evidently seen in Norway. Since the millennium, the NPSS has been assigned with 
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new tasks, significantly more resources, and wide ranging authorities to monitor 
potential threats to national security (22. Juli-kommisjonen, 2012:363-365). 
 
One of the most central insights of the 9/11-investigation suggested that the attacks 
could have been avoided, had the national services and agencies managed to unify 
their effort and coordinate the information in their joint possession (22. juli-
kommisjonen, 2012:394). The planning of the 9/11-attacks fell in the void between 
foreign and domestic threats, which made it harder to make sense of the various 
fragments of intelligence. As during the Cold War, the foreign agencies had their eyes 
on external threats, while domestic agencies were watching for threats within the 
borders. The attack was foreign - but from foreigners who had infiltrated into the US 
(Gill & Phythian, 2006:120). As a result, the 9/11 Commission-report recommended 
increased information-sharing between the services and stronger leadership to promote 
coordination and cooperation. This required, among other things, that structure, 
procedure and culture within the various agencies had to be adapted; away from the 
Cold War’s clear division of labor, to an approach based on more active cooperation 
both within and outside the intelligence community (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:394). 
It was increasingly suggested that the principle of “need to know”, as a means of 
securing information, should be replaced with the “need to share”, in order to 
maximize the potential to learn about and counter new transnational threats. 
Furthermore, while the new threats largely preserved the need for covert intelligence 
and secrecy, society increasingly called for openness and insight into the business of 
intelligence (Herman, 2005:73; Gill & Phythian, 2006:172, 178). Not only were the 
agencies accused of being inefficient and overly secretive. Voices more generally 
argued that intelligence was far too slow, if not incapable, of restructuring and 
adapting their activities to the new threats and opportunities of the post 9/11-
environment (Schreier, 2007:26).  
 
The following passages from the 2001-2002 report for Societal Security clearly 
demonstrate that the Norwegian Government early recognized some of the broader 
implications following the Cold War and 9/11; 
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The terrorist attacks of September 2001 and the subsequent fight against terrorism 
represents a watershed. The need for coordination between ministries and between 
various levels of government was highlighted (St. meld. nr.17, 2001-2002:17, own 
translation). 
 
Today's threat scenario is very complex without one specific dimensioning threat. The 
terrorist attack against the United States on September 11 2001 demonstrates how 
vulnerable the modern society is against such attacks. It cannot be ruled out that 
Norway may be exposed to terrorism which may affect abruptly and extensively. The 
Societal Security effort is, unlike during the Cold War, related to a wide variety of 
security challenges which may arise abruptly and in unexpected ways. These 
challenges will require a high degree of flexibility and a broader scope of the work for 
protecting the society (St. meld. nr.17, 2001-2002:29, own translation). 
 
 
While these extracts seem to suggest a general adaptation of the effort toward national 
security, we have yet to see whether this awareness is also reflected in fundamental 
changes within the NPSS – a question to which this thesis devotes its attention. 
 
1.4.Relevance 
There are several reasons that a study of change in relation to intelligence 
organizations is both timely and relevant. The world has still not fully digested the 
attacks of 9/11, and the Norwegian society remains in shock after the horrible events 
of July 22 2011 (22/7). Although the wider implications of these events are maybe yet 
to be seen, certain things appear clear; intelligence has played, and will continue to 
play a central role.  
 
Over the later years, the NPSS has highlighted the threat of terrorism against Norway 
as steadily increasing. The proportion of international attacks has increased, and 
Scandinavia has more often been designated as a target by terrorist organizations. 
Under this period, militant Islamist groups have commonly been designated the 
premier threat to the Norwegian society (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:46). However, 
when the terror struck Norway on 22/7, the perpetrator was no militant Islamist or 
terrorist organization, but an ethnic Norwegian without proven connections to 
terrorist-networks in other countries. The following report from the July 22 
Commission found no basis to say that the NPSS should have prevented the attacks. 
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Still, it went far in suggesting that the service, with the appropriate working 
procedures and a broader focus, might have caught up with Anders Behring Breivik 
before his fatal acts of violence (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:15, 73). 
 
Although intelligence and security generally has been high on the public agenda after 
22/7, research on societal security has not been a priority in Norway over the later 
years (Aftenposten, 2012). In this sense, 22/7 was a cruel reminder of the vulnerability 
of our modern society and demonstrated the risk of emerging threats going unnoticed 
(Traavikutvalget, 2012:3). The realization that new threats could arise amidst us - in 
the heart of Oslo - revived the many dilemmas and paradoxes of societal security. The 
security environment is complex, and the tradeoffs in handling it are equally difficult. 
Commission reports and discussions following 22/7 have accentuated the need to 
know more on how the intelligence organizations develop in relation to the threats and 
environment they are facing. For an intelligence service, it is utmost important at any 
time to be able to adapt to the environment and, not least, the current threat scenario 
(Holme, 2009:166). These are some of the issues to which this study devotes its 
attention and effort. 
 
Considering that most documents on the NPSS and the follow-up after 22/7 is written 
in Norwegian, a review of the service written in English might in itself be valuable and 
relevant. This is also partly the reason that organization titles, designations and 
abbreviations are translated to English when found relevant. Furthermore, previous 
research and literature on intelligence, which is mainly British and American, often 
focuses on changes in the threat environment, but more rarely on how intelligence 
organizations have adapted to these changes. In this way, the study illuminates 
interesting relationships which undeniably deserve more attention and further research. 
Organizational development in relation to intelligence services, although largely 
under-studied and under-theorized, should and must be researched. Not at least 
because of its relevance for intelligence effectiveness in many countries after 9/11, as 
well as its importance in the post-22/7 reality in Norway. On this note, this study 
provides a more thorough understanding of the complex landscape in which 
8 
 
intelligence currently operates, and how to navigate this landscape in a best possible 
way.  
 
1.5.Limitations 
The broader perspective of the thesis is defined as western intelligence organizations. 
This distinction, although mainly noticeable in the theoretical section, is found 
necessary as the thesis is based on literature originating in the western, and primarily, 
the English-speaking part of the world. Recognizing the absence of any universal 
standards, the focus is thus relevant in order to define the universe in which the case of 
the study belongs. 
 
With regard to the NPSS, the study will focus on the organizational aspects at the more 
strategic level of the service. It is not an objective, nor feasible, to cover tactical units, 
or the shrouded and more sensitive aspects concerning the methods and capabilities of 
the service. The thesis is unclassified and its findings are predominantly based upon 
open source literature. 
 
Moreover, the drivers and barriers identified in the final section of the study are by no 
means meant to be exhaustive. While recognizing that organizational theory points to 
countless reasons to why change might occur or not, the intention of this study is not 
an all-encompassing review of possible explanations for change or continuity within 
organizations. Rather, the purpose is to modestly suggest and discuss some plausible 
barriers and drivers for change as seen in relation to intelligence organizations, 
specifically illustrated through a case study of the NPSS. If nothing else, this 
discussion will provide other researchers with input for a highly interesting topic for 
further scrutiny and in-depth analysis. 
 
In scope of time, the study is generally limited to the post-Cold War period where the 
main emphasis of the analysis is devoted to developments after 2001. Although certain 
historic orientations are needed, the thesis will not dig deep into early antecedents of 
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intelligence. These restrictions in time are considered beneficial in terms of 
manageability, as well as with regard to the implications following the Cold War and 
the 9/11-attacks - causing attention and efforts towards rethinking and reforming the 
organization of western intelligence services. Also, as the public focus on the NPSS 
has increased dramatically in the wake of 22/7, much emphasis will naturally be given 
to the recent processes and reactions which presented from 2011 through October 
2013. 
 
1.6.Thesis outline 
Chapter II presents the theoretical foundation of the study which draws up a variety of 
thoughts rooted mainly within intelligence literature and theory. These insights 
illustrate that intelligence after the end of the Cold War faced a revolution which 
transformed the requirements for intelligence organization. These requirements for 
intelligence organizations are presented and operationalized by means of indicators, 
which accordingly can be applied in the analysis of the study. The rationale behind the 
framework is to let the theories suggest how modern intelligence should be organized 
in relation to the changed premises after the Cold War. In this way, the theories 
indicate what should be observed in an appropriately organized intelligence 
organization. 
 
Chapter III presents the methods and means of the study, discussing the challenges and 
opportunities for assuring good quality in the study as a whole.  
 
Chapter IV presents and analyses the developments and relevant material through the 
eyes of the theoretical expectations. This will allow for an assessment of how the 
NPSS has adapted in accordance with the changed premises in the security 
environment. This includes matters such as organizational reforms, changes in 
strategies, new entities or structures, leadership, as well as resources and personnel. 
Throughout the analysis the study will consistently pay attention to any potential key 
mechanisms – drivers and barriers – which might explain organizational change or 
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continuity within the organization. These will be summarized and discussed following 
each section. 
 
Chapter V concludes the study by summarizing its main findings, both with regard to 
the aptness of current organization as well as the identified key mechanisms for 
explaining change or continuity within intelligence organizations. 
 
As a whole, the study thereby provides insights into the organizational direction of the 
NPSS, the ability of the organization to adapt in accordance with the security 
environment, and the potential drivers and barriers for organizational change and 
development within the organization. 
 
1.7.Concepts 
This part presents some conceptual clarifications in relation to the study. The chapter 
offers its attention first to the concepts of organizational change and intelligence, 
before narrowing it down to clarify the case of intelligence in Norway. 
 
1.7.1.Organizational change 
The term “organization” is one that traditionally is associated with something stable 
and predictable - reducing variation to foster efficiency. Nevertheless, it is hard 
imagining an organization preserving the same exact characteristics throughout its 
whole existence. Changes, at one scale or another, are inevitable. Organizations are 
growing and shrinking. They are fused or separated, discontinued or redefined. Change 
is the organizational contradiction which tears down stability for the objective of 
progress. In an age where society is changing faster than ever before, it is ever 
important to keep up with this change, and it is increasingly argued that organizations 
need develop a capacity to change in order to survive (Jacobsen & Thorvik, 2007:350-
351).  
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What is it that defines organizational change? Organizational change is a large, 
complex field, and the specific definitions vary across different perspectives within 
organizational theory. For the purpose of this thesis however, one could simply say 
that organizational change involves restructuring in the form that an organization 
displays different features on two separate points in time. The nature of the change in 
itself can take various forms. Practically it is often hard to assert precisely what is 
being changed, simply because the components of an organization are interrelated and 
changes in one part are thus likely to produce changes in another. In theory however, 
organizational change often includes changes in one or several of the following 4 
organizational features: (1) change in goals, tasks, and/or strategies; (2) change in 
structure; (3) change in culture, and/or; (4) change in behavior, such as communication 
and decision-making (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2007:351-352, 354). 
 
1.7.2.Intelligence 
Even though considerable effort has been devoted to establish a universal concept of 
intelligence, one has yet to agree on a precise and widely accepted definition of the 
term. Pioneering scholars in the field tend to differ on what such a definition should 
include. This section aims to narrow the term down to approach a useful definition for 
the purpose of this study.  
 
Although intelligence for many people may not seem much different than information, 
distinguishing the two is important. Indeed, intelligence is always information, but not 
all information is intelligence. In governments, intelligence is commonly regarded a 
subset of the broader category of information, representing the entire process by which 
intelligence is identified, obtained and analyzed in response to the needs of decision-
makers (Lowenthal, 2009:1; Herman, 2009:1). Intelligence thus fathoms broader than 
merely the informational aspects of the concept. This is clearly evident in the early 
work of American academic Sherman Kent. In 1949, Kent coined a threefold 
definition of intelligence, which later has come to be one of the most frequently 
applied definitions of the concept. In line with Kent’s understanding, the central 
12 
 
aspects of intelligence can be summarized as: ”the process by which specific types of 
information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and 
provided to policy makers; the products of that process (…); and the carrying out of 
operations as requested by lawful authorities” (Lowenthal, 2009:8). As demonstrated 
by this definition, intelligence can be understood as a blanket term, covering three 
closely interrelated phenomena. Firstly, intelligence points to the activity or process - 
often referred to as the intelligence cycle - in which information is required and 
requested by policy makers, then collected and analyzed by the intelligence 
organizations, and finally disseminated back to its consumers.  
 
                          
                                   Figure I: The Intelligence Cycle (Lowenthal, 2009:65)  
 
Secondly, intelligence refers to the outcome of this activity, namely the product and 
analyses which are disseminated to inform decision-makers. And thirdly, intelligence 
refers to the specific organizations, agencies, and units that carry out the various 
operations and functions of intelligence (Lowenthal, 2009:8). The key element for this 
study is the third and organizational conception of intelligence, seen as a set of 
governmental organizations, often referred to as intelligence organizations, agencies 
or services. However, as all the three conceptions of intelligence are closely 
interrelated, the study will necessarily touch upon matters related to the activities of 
the organizations and the products which they produce (Herman, 2009:2). The term 
intelligence organization in this study refers to a government agency or organization 
Planning and 
direction 
Collection 
Processing 
and 
exploitation 
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which carries out intelligence activities for the government. The concept intelligence 
community denotes two or more of these organizations, whose work is often related 
and sometimes combined, but at the foundation they generally serve different clients 
and work under various chains of authority and control (Lowenthal, 2009:11). 
 
Although not part of the definition itself, most scholars commonly also acknowledge 
that intelligence does often, but not always, have an element of secrecy where it is 
collected through covert methods or obtained from sources which must be protected 
(Baylis, et al., 2010:163). Secrecy, although most pertinent to the activities and 
products, is a trademark of intelligence, and one which generally distinguishes it from 
other types of government functions (Lowenthal, 2009:1; Herman, 2005:4-5). 
 
1.7.3.The Norwegian Police Security Service 
The NPSS is a civilian agency which operates in the domestic sphere. It is organized 
as directly subordinate to the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and reports to the minister but 
functions as rather independent part of the Norwegian Police Force (Sejersted, 
2005:122). The daily collaboration between the NPSS and the ministry is rooted in the 
Police Department within the MoJ, which carries the main responsibility for the 
management and control of the NPSS (Traavikutvalget, 2012:17). 
 
The mandate of the NPSS is given by the Police Act, and currently covers; preventing, 
countering and investigating crimes against the state’s security and independence. This 
includes illegal intelligence activities, illegal transfer of technology, proliferation of 
WMDs, sabotage and politically motivated violence. These tasks of the NPSS can be 
summarized into three main categories: intelligence, investigation and security. While 
the purpose of intelligence activities is to detect any potential threats that can be 
prevented or avoided, investigation work to determine crimes to be prosecuted. The 
security-aspect of the tasks is primarily related to safety briefings, advice and life 
guard service in relation to government officials (Traavikutvalget, 2012:12). Out of 
these tasks, the main concern of this thesis is the intelligence related activities, 
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including such as counterintelligence against foreign agencies operating on Norwegian 
soil, and surveillance of national citizens and groups representing a potential threat to 
national security or other vital national interests (Sejersted, 2005:122). The NPSS is 
structured in departments and sections, and the structure reflects a thematic approach 
to the various tasks of the service. 
 
 
Figure II: NPSS - Organizational Structure (Traavikutvalget, 2012:14) 
 
The biggest department is the Operative Department, which is responsible for 
intelligence operations within the NPSS. The department is divided into the following 
seven sections; Counter-intelligence, Counter-terrorism, Non-proliferation, Counter-
extremism and Organized Crime, Technological Support, Undercover Operations, and 
Open Sources. The Department for Analysis is responsible for processing and 
analyzing information which mainly collected by the Operative Department from 
various sources. This information is presented in thematic reports and threat 
assessments of various kinds. The department comprises three sections; Strategic 
Analysis, Threat Assessments, and Consultancy. The Department for Security is 
mainly concerned with the internal security of the NPSS and providing lifeguard 
services for government officials (Traavikutvalget, 2012:13-15). These departments 
are those which mainly interest the objectives of this thesis. 
 
In addition to the NPSS, the Norwegian Intelligence Community includes the 
Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) and the National Security Authority (NSA). The 
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organizational structure of the community reflects the traditional distinction common 
to many democratic states, distinguishing between external intelligence and internal 
intelligence/counterintelligence. The NIS is Norway's only foreign intelligence service 
and it is organized as part of the Armed Forces, reporting to the Chief of Defense and 
the Minister of Defense. In contrary to the NPSS, the NIS collects information about 
situations and conditions outside Norwegian borders (EOS-utvalget, n.d.). The NSA is 
a cross-sectorial protective and supervisory directorate, reporting both to the Minister 
of Defense and the Minister of Justice. Among others, the NSA is the highest authority 
for issuing and withdrawing personnel security clearances and for classifying and 
declassifying information. Although the NSA is secretive, it does not conduct 
operations such as the NPSS and the NIS (NSM, n.d.; Sejersted, 2005:122). 
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Chapter II: Theory 
The theoretical framework of this study is founded mainly on intelligence theory, with 
contributions from disciplines including international relations (IR), international 
security policy and organizational theory. The first section of the chapter will therefore 
provide an introduction to the theoretical field of intelligence and clarify the 
theoretical point of departure for the thesis - that intelligence after the end of the Cold 
War has faced a revolution. The second part presents the substance of this revolution, 
which has transformed the role and requirements for intelligence organizations. These 
requirements are operationalized by means of indicators which can facilitate analysis 
and discussion of the Norwegian case. 
 
2.1.The theoretical field of intelligence 
Compared to vast fields such as IR, theories of intelligence are both young and 
underdeveloped. Intelligence has been an academic discipline for over half a century, 
and from the beginning until today, scholars have consistently called for a theory of 
intelligence. Although some authors have entitled sections of their work “theory of 
intelligence”, only a few books have to date attempted to collect some of the main 
work in the field. Much is still to be discovered, and the positions within intelligence 
theory are clearly not as entrenched as they are in political science and other academic 
fields. For many years, at least until the end of the Cold War, intelligence was often 
described as the “missing dimension” of historical accounts, but since then, 
circumstances have changed and the amount of research is now steadily growing. This 
is partially due to the declassification and release of historical files, but also because of 
the many questions posed by the September 2001 attacks, followed by others in 
Madrid, London and elsewhere. These attacks and their responses from Western 
governments injected urgency into debates about intelligence, thereby forcing it out of 
the shadows from which it emerged after the Cold War (Gill, et al, 2009:1-2; Gill, 
2009:208). 
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Theories on intelligence are, much like political science, historically dominated by a 
paradigm predicated largely on the assumptions of IR realism, often referred to as the 
“national security intelligence paradigm”. As the focus of intelligence is on security 
and securing relative advantages, the close tie with realism is no surprise, considering 
that realism is the explanatory approach most centrally concerned with security. The 
requirement for the former arises out of the latter’s assumptions about the nature of the 
international system. Outlined by John Mearsheimer, these are; 
1. Great powers are the main actors in world politics, and operate in an anarchic 
international system; 
2. All states possess some offensive military capability; 
3. States can never be certain about the intentions of other states; 
4. The main goal of states is survival; 
5. States are rational actors. 
 
In the view of realists, the combination of these assumptions generates an unending 
security competition, which already provides a theoretical explanation for certain key 
questions in intelligence, such as why intelligence is necessary, and why intelligence 
agencies did not disappear with the passing of the Cold War. Such organizations exist 
in order to reduce this uncertainty about current and future intentions of other states, 
and to provide warning of any trouble ahead to reduce fear. States operate in an 
international anarchy where trust is low and wars might occur because there is no 
higher authority to prevent them. Due to this, states will help themselves as best they 
can and organize intelligence to act as needed, and as secretly as necessary. As this 
suggests, realism also provides an explanation for the centrality of secrecy to 
intelligence. In system based upon the principle of self-help, states can only rely on 
themself to provide for their security, and secrecy is therefore an essential ingredient to 
secure advantage or avoid the development of disadvantageous situations (Phythian, 
2009:57-59). 
 
However, the realist viewpoint has some clear limitations. For once, realism was 
designed to be a parsimonious theory and should not be considered as an explanation 
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of all international activity. In fact, the theory omits a broad range of relevant actors 
and factors from its explanatory apparatus. As realism essentially is a theory about 
state behavior and conflict, it has little to say about transnational non-state actors such 
as al-Qaeda, or the increased level of international cooperation witnessed in the post-
9/11 environment. Nor can realism give an account for challenges posed by the 
environment, diseases, or issues such as migration or transnational organized crime 
(Phythian, 2009:60). Although many of the assumptions underpinning the traditional 
Westphalian model - which entrenched the principle of territorial sovereignty in inter-
state affairs - are still operative in international relations today, the contemporary 
applicability of the model is dubious. 
 
Therefore, in order to approach a useful outlook for studying the Norwegian 
intelligence community this thesis departs from the traditional military and state-
centered perspectives on intelligence. Drawing on variety of literature, the following 
section offers some different perspectives which direct attention to the post-Cold War 
transformation in the role and requirements for intelligence.  
 
2.2.New perspectives and new requirements 
As belatedly acknowledged in IR literature, one of the distinctive features of the 
contemporary transnational system is that the state is no longer the structural key-stone 
in once was. As James Sheptycki (2009:168) puts it, “the world system is a 
polycentric power system where non-state, supra-state, and sub-state actors all play 
roles in the governance of security that are equal to, and perhaps even more central 
than, the roles played by state actors”. The dominant perception of intelligence, 
shaped by the assumptions of Realism, is increasingly challenged by the post-Cold 
War developments which alter the nature of the global system, stretching social 
relations across space and time along a variety of institutional dimensions - 
technological, organizational, legal and cultural (Sheptycki, 2009:168, 170).  
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Since the end of the Cold War, the complex debate over globalization - its effects, 
nature and meaning - has been one of the dominant themes in IR. For what concerns 
intelligence, globalization has accelerated a wide range of sub-military transnational 
threats of which terrorism is only one example (Aldrich, 2009:889-890). Peter Gill and 
Mark Phythian argue that globalization manifests itself along three main dimensions. 
First, it deepens the level of interaction between local and transnational developments, 
second, it broadens the range of involved sectors, and third, it makes the world a 
“smaller place” - so called “spatial stretching” - meaning that developments in one part 
of the world can have immediate and world-wide impact. According to Gill and 
Phythian, these three dimensions together mean that the array of potential threats is 
increasing, and correspondingly, so is the regularity of serious incidents (Gill & 
Phythian, 2006:41). These transnational domains create new tasks and challenges for 
intelligence.  
 
The literature of the following section offers some alternative points of insight 
regarding the new challenges and demands facing intelligence in the post-Cold War 
era, highlighting new perspectives on state role in providing security, the impact of 
globalization on intelligence, the human security paradigm, as well as some 
implications in a Norwegian perspective. From these insights, the thesis identifies 5 
specific requirements which are relevant for modern intelligence services:  
 
(1) Multidisciplinary 
(2) Proactive 
(3) Open and transparent 
(4) Close dialogue with decision-makers 
(5) Cooperative 
 
In the following sections, these requirements are explained before suggesting some 
specific ways in which these can be measured by presenting some potential indicators 
for development within the NPSS. 
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2.2.1.Multidisciplinary 
David Omand provides a useful perspective by highlighting how certain key shifts 
transformed the international security discourse, thereby introducing new demands for 
the organization of intelligence services. According to Omand, one of the main shifts 
is the reorientation of the government’s responsibility in respect of national security to 
encompass a deeper and broader and understanding of security. The deepening 
implies that the focus is shifted towards the protection of the individual and daily life 
of the community, which includes, but goes well beyond defending the territorial 
integrity of the state. The focus on security from a citizen-perspective naturally leads 
to a broadening in potential threats to include the full range of disruptive events - from 
the impact of natural hazards and pandemics, to migration, terrorism, and international 
crime (Omand, 2010:11).  
 
This shift is also evident in the Human Security Doctrine which surfaced during the 
late 90s. The concept of human security shifts the discourse away from the emphasis 
on state-security to focus on security from the view of individual persons and local 
communities (Sheptycki, 2009:171-172). From this perspective, armed conflicts are no 
longer the sole and dominant concern. Rather, security in this form highlights 
numerous other issues which pose significant threats to the society; threats from 
organized crime, illegal migration, diseases, environmental issues, poverty, cyber 
terrorism and international terrorism, to mention some of them. The underlying 
realization was that many of these issues had a much more destructive impact on the 
lives of people than conventional military threats to states (Baylis, et al, 2008:492, 
504; Lowenthal, 2009:6). 
 
In 2007, Stein Fredrik Kynø studied the structure and organization of the Norwegian 
Intelligence Community. Among others, Kynø found that the post-Cold War reality 
necessitate changes in intelligence in order to safeguard Norwegian interests against 
complex threats such as transnational crime and non-state terrorist organizations, as 
well as supporting a foreign and security policy that includes an increasing number of 
ministries (Kynø, 2010: 167). During the Cold War, Norwegian intelligence focused 
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on the capacities, activities and intentions of the Soviet Union. Today, evolvements in 
the security environment suggests that the focus needs to be more on transnational 
non-state actors and other new threats which may pose a danger, not only to the 
territorial integrity of the state, but also to the nation’s human and societal security and 
its system of values (Kynø, 2010: 156-157). 
 
Vegard Valther Hansen emphasize that the new threats and globalization in the post-
Cold War period most notably has increased the requirements for analytical capacities 
within intelligence (Hansen, referred in Wilhelmsen, 2011:49). The increased 
complexity in the threat environment means that intelligence agencies need to recruit 
broader expertise in order to “connect the dots”. The competency requirements for 
intelligence are therefore not dissimilar to that of the ministries, including political 
scientists, historians and economists, to mention some (Wilhelmsen, 2011:51-52). 
 
Together, these developments require that intelligence organizations are 
multidisciplinary in their staffing, outlook and analysis in order to produce intelligence 
on a range of issues within a broader understanding of security. Potential indicators to 
evaluate development within the NPSS are: 
 
 Internal or external sources indicate broad recruitment 
Statements from internal sources or knowledgeable external sources which 
demonstrate a broader approach to recruitment or otherwise indicate the 
recruitment strategy or staffing of the service. 
 Figures demonstrate increased level of broad expertize  
Figures showing an increased proportion of employees with background from 
various disciplines outside the police. 
 Competency requirements and job advertisements 
The announced needs for expertise and public job advertisements demonstrate 
that the service hires analytics with varied academic background. 
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2.2.2.Proactive 
Paradoxically, while the general fear in western societies increased relentlessly after 
9/11, none of the so-called “new threats” were of comparable scale to the Cold War-
threat of mutual annihilation. However, in the globalized world, threats appeared more 
diverse, fluid, and complex than ever before (Gill & Phythian, 2006:172). Wilhelmsen 
found that these developments require intelligence to take a more preventive and 
proactive role, in opposite to its previously more reactive stance (Wilhelmsen, 
2011:35). Intelligence needs to be as much in advance as possible in order to predict 
and unveil future threats, and to understand their underlying causes and suggest 
preventative measures. Omand refers to this shift as an increased emphasis on the 
value of anticipation. From the more reactive stance of the Cold War, Omand suggests 
that looking ahead to recognize the future has become increasingly important in order 
to justify attention before the danger becomes present, preferably reducing the impact 
of threats, and ideally acing in advance as to avert the problems altogether. In other 
words, proactivity is required to avert the possible adverse consequences of inaction 
before they materialize. The increased focus on anticipation naturally raises the 
importance of having effective intelligence services to provide input to the pre-
emptive effort. Furthermore, anticipation is not only defined by capabilities to detect 
terrorist networks and frustrate impending plots, but also to understand the underlying 
ideology of the terrorists and explain their motivations in order to prevent future 
radicalization and implement risk-mitigating policies. To be useful, such work needs 
to be fundamentally multidisciplinary, and to some extent, break out of the wall of 
secrecy surrounding most intelligence activities. Omand emphasize that an approach 
like this would require contributions from most of the capabilities of civil government 
(Omand, 2010:11-12). 
 
According to James Sheptycki the human security perspective also takes a more 
proactive formula than the traditional security perspective. Whether it is sudden threats 
such as earthquakes or enduring threats such as poverty, human security promotes the 
development of early warning mechanisms to help to mitigate the impact of current 
threats and, where possible, prevent the occurrence of future threats. The approach 
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aims to be proactive about the fundamental causes of insecurity, not simply an event-
driven reaction to manifestations of insecurity (Sheptycki, 2009:171-172). In this 
perspective, intelligence should not only have capabilities to present relevant forecasts 
and timely projections about future concerns, but also be able to change its focus and 
alter direction when the circumstances require such (Kynø, 2010: 158). 
 
According to these insights, intelligence organizations need to be proactive and 
strategic in order to predict and unveil future threats and to understand their underlying 
causes in order to suggest preventative measures, including the ability to change focus 
and alter direction. Potential indicators to evaluate development within the NPSS are: 
 
 Statements of strategic perspective and attention to new threats 
Statements indicate that the service has a strategic perspective and pay notion to 
potential new and emerging threats which are not commonly established as 
current threats. 
 Stated focus on root-causes 
Statements indicate that the service focuses on the root-causes of threats and 
work proactively in order to avert potential threats from becoming real. 
 Evidence of prevented threats 
Evidence or statements indicate that threats have been detected and impeded 
before becoming a real threat to the society. 
 Legal provisions or organizational amendments  
New legal provisions or organizational changes have been introduced with the 
aim to facilitate a proactive effort of intelligence. 
 
2.2.3.Open and transparent 
Today, secret services are constantly monitored, examined and called to account. 
Agencies that previously operated in the shadows now work under the spotlight of a 
globalized media, which is not much constrained by rules of state secrecy. According 
to Richard J. Aldrich, this is another effect of globalization  - the growth of vast 
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networks of global civil society and human rights campaigners, which have introduced 
higher expectations for ethical policy, regulation, transparency and accountability. One 
result of this is evident in the regulatory revolution during the 90s where the European 
Convention on Human Rights was written into the core guidance of European 
intelligence and security services. Accountability no longer flows exclusively from 
parliamentary oversight committees, but increasingly from a network of activists and 
journalists (Aldrich, 2009:892). In a democratic state, intelligence services need not 
only be efficient in dealing with threats, they also need to function in a legitimate and 
democratic manner. In this relation, Baylis notes that one of the big challenges for 
democracies today is to figure out how to battle irregular threats while still remaining 
true to its democratic values (Baylis, et al., 2010:155). After all, one of the basic 
principles of democracy is to secure and maintain the public consent for the activities 
of the state, and intelligence agencies should accordingly, like other areas of state 
activity, be perceived as performing a necessary function, demonstrate the efficiency 
and effectiveness of their operation, and be held accountable for their actions and those 
of their members (Caparini, 2007:3).  
 
According to Sheptycki, the need for intelligence openness is also reflected in the 
human security doctrine, which holds that its own legitimacy is secured through 
transparency and public engagement with the political processes of the society in 
which it operates (Sheptycki, 2009:171-172). Political and public confidence is a 
precondition for the intelligence services to perform effectively, especially when 
considering the means at their hands. As during the Cold War, the methods and 
sources of the services still needs to remain protected from public disclosure, but the 
intelligence organizations needs to offer the public more insight into its contribution 
for safeguarding vital national interests and supporting the established political 
interests. Exaggerated concealment might lead to unnecessary suspicions and 
accusations, breed mistrust among the public, and in the long term, weaken the 
services ability to effectively perform their mandated tasks and operations (Kynø, 
2010: 158-159). By raising the public awareness of their effort, work and contribution 
toward a safer society, the services could devote less resource to defend their 
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activities, in turn providing more room for focusing on tasks within their primary 
responsibility (Kynø, 2010: 156-157). 
 
On this background, the intelligence organizations need to be as open and transparent 
as possible, in order to maintain community confidence in their efforts. Potential 
indicators to evaluate development within the NPSS are: 
 
 Stated awareness and clear strategy for openness 
Stated awareness from the service, acknowledging the need to be open towards 
the society, and clearly defining which matters the service can and cannot be 
open about.  
 Active communication 
The service is actively engaging in communication toward the society through 
websites or other platforms. 
 Information is easy accessible 
Information around the work and effort of the organization is easily accessible 
for the public eye. 
 Public appearances 
Representatives from the agencies make public appearances through the media, 
speeches, interviews, articles, etc. 
 Declassification of information 
The agencies declassify or release information or documents for the public 
domain, allowing externals such as researchers or the media review their 
organization, work, and general effort toward securing the society. 
 
2.2.4.Close dialogue with decision-makers 
Trond Arntsen highlights that one of the prominent challenges of intelligence is that 
political decision-makers often do not understand its nature and application, while the 
intelligence services – due to lack of knowledge and long distance to their users – do 
not manage to get through with relevant, timely and precise information (Arntsen, 
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2010: 131). To ensure relevant support, right priorities and an effective feedback loop, 
it is decisive that the services and political decision-makers maintain a short and clear 
chain of communication. During the height of the Cold War the main input required by 
the government was a threat assessment of High, Medium, or Low. Today’s complex 
issues and threats clearly necessitate new standards for communication between 
intelligence services and decision-makers (Kynø, 2010: 157-158).  
 
The requirement for intelligence organizations to provide analyzes in a number of 
Norway’s areas of interest has intensified significantly since the end of the Cold War. 
According to Kynø, the increased demand for intelligence from a number of ministries 
have magnified the requirement for the service’s to provide support for decisions 
across a variety of departments and sectors related to Norwegian interest. This means 
that the services need to be accessible to more governmental actors outside its parent 
ministry (Kynø, 2010: 155-156). This is also reflected by Kjetil Wilhelmsen who 
found that the new paradigm and its increased complexity generated more and new 
customers to intelligence. The dialogue with the customers is by intelligence services 
designated to be one of the most important instruments for achieving good products, 
and with the expanded portfolio and increased number of users, this dialogue has 
become more demanding under the post-Cold War paradigm. This necessitates more 
interaction and closer communication between intelligence and its principals 
(Wilhelmsen, 2011:33-34).  
 
To ensure relevant support, right priorities and an effective feedback loop, it is 
decisive that the services and political decision-makers maintain a short and clear 
chain of command. Today’s complex environment necessitates new standards for 
communication between intelligence services and a variety of political decision-
makers. Potential indicators to evaluate development within the NPSS are: 
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 Clear chains of communication 
Evidence that clear instructions and clear chains of communication are 
established for the relationship between the service and the relevant 
ministries/governmental actors. 
 Provides support to high-level decision-makers and the wider government 
Intelligence resources are allocated specifically for relevant political actors, 
such as in direct support to high-level decision-makers. 
 Government officials recognize the value of intelligence 
Evidence that government officials recognize and utilize the potential of 
intelligence to support decision making. 
 
2.2.5.Cooperative 
The broadened scope of potential threats and their transnational nature has blurred the 
traditional distinction between strictly foreign and domestic domains, thereby 
necessitating more cooperation within the intelligence community (Kynø, 2010: 156-
157). Aldrich highlight that globalization has delivered new opportunities for criminal 
activity and violence on a considerable scale, and while international crime in itself is 
nothing new, the criminal structures witnessed today are more adaptive and 
undifferentiated. They are highly decentralized, horizontal, and fluid; they specialize 
in cross-border movement and are also very proficient in their use of modern 
technologies. They are, as Aldrich puts it, “the miscreants of globalization”. Aldrich 
portrays a seemingly borderless world in which states bounce clumsily around while 
their many illicit opponents dance elegantly. He argues that the shift towards 
transnational threats has presented intelligence services with major challenges, 
precisely because today’s threats operate in the seams of national jurisdictions. 
Intelligence services, which traditionally cooperated hesitantly, are now forced to 
share widely with a wide array of domestic and foreign partners, in an effort to keep 
up with elusive opponents (Aldrich, 2009:890-891). 
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As during the Cold War, the need to clearly define and distinguish the roles of internal 
and external intelligence services is still applicable. However, in an increasingly 
complex environment with threats operating regardless of state boarders, cooperation 
and joint assessments within and outside the intelligence community has become 
essential. Structures, instructions and legislations therefore need to be adapted to these 
new realities. The organizations need to facilitate coordination and cooperation which 
can ensure the effective use of all intelligence resources in the government’s 
possession (Kynø, 2010: 159-160).  
 
In conclusion, intelligence organizations need to be properly organized for cooperation 
and coordination with other intelligence organizations, as well as with other relevant 
actors of government. Potential indicators to evaluate development are: 
 
 Legal provisions and instructions for cooperation 
Legal provisions and instructions facilitate for cooperation between the 
services, and clearly delineate what form such cooperation should take and 
what the cooperation should entail. 
 Joint units 
New entities established for the purpose of coordination and cooperation. 
 Joint products 
Joint-products such as analyses or assessments have been prepared involving 
personnel from the various services. 
 Arrangements for cooperation with other relevant actors 
Arrangements and instructions are established to facilitate and ensure the 
cooperation with other relevant actors outside the intelligence community. 
 
Through relevant insights and perspectives, this chapter has demonstrated how the new 
security environment transformed the role and requirements for modern intelligence 
organization. Before these are applied to analyze the case of the study, the following 
chapter will describe the methods and procedures of the research. 
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Chapter III: Methodology 
The principal design of this research can be described as an exploratory case study, 
aiming to gain a deeper understanding of the subject and identify some potential 
mechanisms or hypotheses which might be applicable to other cases and subsequent 
studies. This chapter sets out to demonstrate the methods of the research, herein 
discussing some of its strengths and limitations when it comes to assuring quality in 
the study. This implies that some attention will be given to issues concerning the 
classical criteria of validity and reliability. 
 
3.1.Exploratory design 
The purpose of the study is to describe developments within the NPSS in relation to 
the security environment and discuss potential key mechanisms, which can explain 
either change or continuity within the organization. The research is inductive in its 
approach, which by Ottar Hellevik is highlighted to be especially useful when the field 
under analysis is little conceptualized or unexplored, meaning that there are few 
established models for the research to be based upon (Hellevik, 2002:83). Rather than 
testing a set of pre-determined hypotheses, the focus of the study is to discover 
interesting relationships and mechanisms related to organizational change in 
intelligence organizations. The study collects a great amount of data, which is then 
analyzed through a framework of requirements for modern intelligence organizations. 
By carefully studying the organization’s response in relation to the framework the 
research is able to identify and discuss a variety of potential catalysts and barriers for 
change in relation to intelligence organizations.  
 
According to McNabb, most exploratory research is conducted for one of two 
purposes: (1) preparatory examination of an issue in order to gain insight and ideas, or 
(2) information-gathering for immediate application to an administrative problem. In 
neither of these cases is exploratory research intended to serve as an in-depth scrutiny 
of all the factors related to a political phenomenon. The research can provide input to 
administrative decision-making by highlighting organizational issues or possible 
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answers to organizational questions - an approach which is frequently used in public 
administration. However, the majority of exploratory research is conducted to 
investigate an issue or topic in order to develop insight and ideas about its underlying 
nature. In these cases, there is usually limited prior knowledge about the topic at hand 
or even few preconceptions about how to study the issue. As a result, exploratory 
research is often flexible and usually involves qualitative methods such as examination 
of documentary evidence (McNabb, 2010:96-97).  
 
3.2.Case study 
The research is a case study of the NPSS, supplemented with a limited number of 
examples from other countries for illustrative and comparative purposes. In David 
McNabb’s book, Research Methods for Political Science, a case study is referred to as 
the study of one of something – essentially including any single event, person, 
organizational unit, or whatever else applicable to the world of politics (McNabb, 
2010:104). In this research, the examination of the NPSS can be regarded a study of 
one intelligence organization within the universe of western intelligence organizations.  
 
Some advantageous points of the case study method should be highlighted. For one, 
case studies often tend to bring out information that might be ignored or not even 
brought to mind in other study methods. Case studies push researchers to work in 
depth, and to go beyond the surface indications in order to dig out the reasons and 
meanings - not merely descriptions - for why things happen as they do. Political 
phenomena like intelligence organizations are not simple and single-faceted; usually 
they will be as complex as the people who function within them. In this relation, the 
case study can serve to remind researchers of the complexity of the political world by 
facilitating a detailed examination down to the level of individual persons (McNabb, 
2010:105). This is found especially beneficial in order to achieve the necessary level 
of detail and depth to explore the relatively understudied topic of this study.  
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3.3.Sources and data 
In similar to most research on intelligence organizations, this study will at one stage or 
another meet some empirical challenges related to the sensitivity of the organizations 
and its implicit challenges for accessing the required data for research. Many people 
with insight into the organization might be either reluctant or prohibited to express 
themselves publicly on the topic. Nonetheless, I do believe that the questions of the 
study, with an exclusive focus on organizational matters, are in fact amenable to 
research without access to graded information. This is especially due to developments 
following 22/7, which has caused significant public attention toward some of the 
central questions of this study. The objective was to write an unclassified thesis and 
the predominant share of sources are those which already available in the open forum. 
 
The findings of the study are based upon qualitative analysis of relevant primary and 
secondary sources. Specifically, primary sources include official governmental 
records, reports and transcripts from open hearings, transcripts from interviews, as 
well as reports released by the service itself, such as internal assessments, web-posts, 
and public threat assessments. The relevant secondary sources are mainly commission 
reports, the media, previous research, external examinations, and other relevant 
publications and literature on the topic. For the process of gathering information, the 
limited public material available paired with the exploratory nature of the study 
implied that a broad and inclusive approach to data collection was required. After 
identifying many potential sources and documents, the first step of the analysis 
implied reading the documents and labeling those sections and themes which might be 
of interest according to the predefined indicators of the study (see chapter II). In the 
following step, these sections were written into another document to achieve better 
structure and more detailed labels of the material. These two steps, although time-
consuming, were found highly useful when writing the analysis. After an initial draft 
of the analysis had been written, an additional broad data collection was conducted in 
order to fill gaps or identify supplementary evidence to the data-material. This also 
included revisiting the original raw-material that had been identified in the initially, in 
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order to potentially discover overlooked information. This supplementary evidence 
was then instantly incorporated in the analysis. 
 
The broad and inclusive approach to the data-collection means that a cautious and 
critical way of approaching the evidence was central in the process of analysis. The 
researcher had to attain a comprehensive understanding of the origin, context, 
legitimacy and quality of the various materials, especially with regard to secondary 
sources. This was important since the findings of the analysis might be contingent on 
what specific sources of information that were used. In this relation, internal and 
external government sources might represents two distinct viewpoints, which may 
differ equally with respect to pointing criticism or compliments at the intelligence 
organizations and their efforts. More specifically, internal reports and sources 
originated within the organization were expected to reflect a less critical perspective 
on the organization than what was be expected of external sources such as 
commission-reports and news articles. Questions related to organizational culture or 
matters of internal leadership might be easy to critically comment for sources outside 
the organization, but not equally easy for a source which is part of the system itself. 
With regard to secondary sources such as external commission reports, the study also 
visited the original interviews which underpin some of the conclusions of the 
commissions. In this way, the research might not only assure the quality of these 
secondary sources, but also potentially observe statements which were not found 
relevant within the mandate of the commission, but which are relevant for the 
objectives of this study.  
 
One should also note that general policy-documents developed within the organization 
or within the government often might indicate an intent to change or develop the 
organization. However, these intentions cannot, without evidence of action within the 
organization, be assumed to constitute actual developments. Rather, what these 
documents can illustrate is that the organization and the government acknowledge and 
are attentive to the need for development. In the analysis, such accounts are therefore 
not referred to as development, but awareness. 
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These issues present some of the challenges with the material, which will require 
continuous and careful attention throughout the analysis. 
 
3.4.Validity and Reliability 
Validity and reliability are central criterions for evaluating the quality of a research. 
Two types of validity are relevant for this study; external validity and internal validity. 
External validity pertains to the potential for drawing generalizations from the findings 
of the study. Such generalizations are often highlighted as one major challenge of case 
studies. Some would even claim that the goals of specificity and generality are 
mutually exclusive (Gerring, 2007:20). Nevertheless, as many intelligence 
organizations generally share the same fundamental characteristics, the findings of this 
study might prove applicable to other similar cases, especially with regard to 
explaining change or continuity within western intelligence organizations. Moreover, 
it is likely that several identified drivers and barriers for change might remain 
relatively stable in time, thus allowing for potential generalization to other future time 
periods with reference to the same specific case. 
 
Internal validity on the other hand, refers to the internal accuracy of the analysis as a 
whole. In other words; does the study analyze what it was intended to analyze and is 
the data relevant for answering the questions of the study (Hellevik, 2002:102, 183, 
357). In chapter II, the study identified 5 requirements and suggested some indicators 
to assess developments within the NPSS. Seen in relation to the data material, these 
indicators have certain challenges which deserve some attention here. One requirement 
for modern intelligence services is that they need to be sufficiently open and 
transparent in order to maintain community confidence in their effort. However, this 
requirement might pose some concerns to the validity when examining all the other 
requirements. In this case, the research might be disposed to wrongly assume that the 
service has become more proactive, multidisciplinary, has closer dialogue with 
decision-makers and are more cooperative, simply because the data on these indicators 
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has increased as a function of the services being more open and transparent toward the 
society. The research should therefore guard itself from inferring that more 
information is synonymous with development, which could yield a biased 
representation of the developments. When early data-material on the indicators is 
underrepresented, the research needs to find sources which can demonstrate actual 
progress and development during the period under study, for instance through 
statements from knowledgeable sources.  
 
Reliability in qualitative studies refers to the accuracy and use of the data gathered. 
More specifically, this relates to the trustworthiness of the sources in the study, and 
how conscientiously the collection of data has been undertaken (Hellevik, 2002:53, 
363). Furthermore, reliability also concerns the extent that the study facilitates and 
allows for successive testing and replication of its results and findings (Manheim, et al, 
2008). If several independent replications of the study would obtain the same 
conclusions by using the same exact methods, reliability of the research would be 
high. In order to allow other researchers to evaluate and possibly repeat the study, the 
researcher will consistently and honestly seek to clarify the sources, their origins, and 
their availability in the open forum (Manheim, et al, 2008). However, the data-material 
in itself might still present concerns to reliability, and being aware of these challenges 
is important in order to ensure the right representation of the organization and its 
ability to change. In this relation, it is expected that sources within the organization 
might publicly want to portray an overly positive image of the organization, simply 
because this reflects upon that person as a leader or upon the public confidence in the 
organization. By triangulating sources of different origin, such as the media, external 
sources and internal sources, the study can use various references in order to achieve a 
more balanced representation, which again will serve to strengthen the reliability of 
the analysis.  
 
Reliability concerns are also evident in the use of secondary sources such as 
newspapers, where the identities of the informants are often not disclosed. Usually, the 
newspaper, in similar to intelligence itself, has to protect its sources in order to obtain 
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information on the more sensitive matters or criticism toward the organization. Thus, 
the reliability of these sources is largely left to the ethics and quality of the Norwegian 
press. Even though the researcher will not be able to achieve the full confidence in a 
newspaper’s true reproduction of informants opinions, the sources can to some extent 
be tested by cross-checking the opinions with different sources. Furthermore, the 
findings of central secondary sources, such as the commission reports following 22/7, 
can also be assured by visiting the original interviews of the commission which later 
has been declassified for the public eye. To further strengthen the reliability and avoid 
potential misrepresentations and misunderstandings, important sections of the data-
material are also presented by quoting the original sources.  
 
With these methodological considerations and challenges in mind, the following 
chapter sets out to analyze developments within the NPSS in relation to the identified 
requirements for modern intelligence organizations. 
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Chapter IV: Developments - drivers and barriers 
Western governments have responded to the threat of terrorism in several different 
ways. Many countries have implemented measures to improve national and 
international security cooperation; some have developed new entities while others 
have adapted legislation and administrative procedures (Whelan, 2012:2). Similarly, 
the NPSS has undertaken steps and organizational adjustments in response to the 
changed premises after the Cold War, and most noticeably, after 9/11. 
 
The insights of Chapter II have demonstrated how the end of the Cold War and the 
events of 9/11 gave new direction to Western and Norwegian ways of thinking about 
security. In this chapter, the study turns to the identified requirements for modern 
intelligence organizations in order to assess developments within the NPSS. The 
indicators for development that were presented in chapter II will provide some 
guidelines for this effort by suggesting which material and evidence that potentially 
can demonstrate development. Furthermore, the analysis will continuously seek to 
identify potential key mechanisms - drivers and barriers – which might explain change 
or continuity within the organization. 
 
4.1.Multidisciplinary 
.  
 
Early efforts at recruitment 
In 1994, the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) appointed the Lund Commission to 
examine the activities of the Police Surveillance Service from 1945. The findings of 
the Commission documented extensive surveillance of Norwegian citizens throughout 
the whole post-war period, and the report testified that “special relations” were 
Intelligence organizations need to be multidisciplinary in their staffing, outlook and analysis 
in order to produce intelligence on a range of issues within a broader understanding of 
security. 
 
Indicators: 
 Internal or external sources indicate broad recruitment 
 Figures demonstrate increased level of broad expertize  
 Competency requirements and job advertisements 
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established between the service and leaders of the ruling Labour Party (Vitkauskas, 
1999:48). The following judgment from the Director of Public Prosecutions 
represented a rough encounter with reality for the intelligence service and signaled that 
a massive cleanup was in the offing (Holme, 2009:170). The Norwegian Parliament 
established the EOS Committee to prevent future scandals. Regulations were 
tightened, and the Danielsen Committee was established to undertake a thorough 
examination of the service (Sejersted, 2005:123; Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:42). In 
1998, the Danielsen Committee presented a series of recommendations which formed 
basis for substantial reorganizations culminating that the service in 2002 took its new 
name, the Police Security Service (Traavikutvalget, 2012:11). Among others, the 
Danielsen Committee emphasized that the service needed to be supplemented with 
external expertise through future appointments in order to strengthen its ability to 
adapt and plan towards the unknown. Acknowledging that stability in staffing could be 
justified on a professional basis, the committee noted that stability also could lead to 
unproductive cemented attitudes and cultures - especially considering that the service 
earlier had received criticisms for its closed culture. Many officials had worked in the 
service over a long period of time, and the committee therefore saw it highly necessary 
to introduce a regular element of new impulse in the service. This was especially 
highlighted in relation to the work on analyses and threat assessments (PST, 2002; 
Justis- og politidepartementet, 1998). 
 
These recommendations from the committee demonstrate that the NPSS early received 
indications of the need to recruit more broadly. Per Sefland, who led the service in the 
period 1997-2003, planned and conducted the first changes. 17 middle managers were 
dismissed and the service hired social scientists, analysts and lawyers (Brunmark & 
Solberg, 2012:42). To a greater extent it was now emphasized recruitment of staff with 
backgrounds outside the police in order to provide the service with more perspectives 
and analytical capabilities (Traavikutvalget, 2012:11). According to Jørn Holme, 
Sefland’s successor, these changes did not go undisputed in the organization and the 
replacement of several leaders was met with internal resistance (Holme, 2009:171-
172). The NPSS headquarter in Oslo underwent a major reorganization, changing 
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name to the Central Unit and reducing the number of departments, creating one single 
operative division which included the former counter-intelligence and counter-
terrorism units, and furthermore, considerably strengthening the analytical functions 
within the service (Traavikutvalget, 2012:11). During an open hearing in the Storting 
in November 2012, Jørn Holme gave his predecessor Sefland a considerable amount of 
honor for initiating what he calls “a cleanup” in the cultures which dominated during 
the Cold War. Holme argues that much was done for adapting the service toward a 
new and broader threat scenario, highlighting that; 
 
The main focus was multidisciplinary expertise and to recruit people other than 
policemen which often had only one year of education - like the old organization 
mainly comprised (Stortinget, 2012, own translation). 
 
The efforts under the leadership of Sefland and Holme provide the study with internal 
evidence that the service early in the 2000s took on a far broader approach to 
recruitment. 
 
Noticeable improvement in expertize 
In 2011, the Norwegian Government appointed the Traavik Commission to evaluate 
the organization and work of the NPSS. The commission found that the changes over 
the last decade had moved the NPSS significantly in direction of becoming a 
multidisciplinary service with a considerable element of academic expertise 
(Traavikutvalget, 2012:11). This is also reflected in the July 22 Commission’s 
interview with Special Advisor at the MoJ, Morten Ruud. Ruud emphasize that the 
NPSS has undergone a massive upgrading, both in terms of expertise and staffing in 
general. 
 
From being purely a police organization, the service has, over the last decade, become 
a multidisciplinary organization with analytical capabilities far beyond what it had 
previously (Ruud, 2012:9, own translation). 
 
According to the Traavik Commission, many work processes have been 
professionalized, and the focus on analysis characterize the service to a much greater 
extent than what was the case 10 years ago. It is also recognized that the organization 
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has worked actively to improve recruitment processes over recent years, which has 
contributed to raise the level of expertise and moved the organization in the direction 
of becoming a modern “knowledge organization” (Traavikutvalget, 2012:11, 47). This 
applies especially to certain areas of the organization such as investigative activities, 
undercover operations and the lifeguard service, where targeted and systematic efforts 
have been made to increase the competence. Common to these areas is their externally 
oriented role, meaning that their work is regularly under review by other actors, which 
accordingly can bring important correctives to the service. The result is that these parts 
of the organization have developed a culture of continuous effort toward improvement, 
among others by taking advantage of the opportunities that lie in vacant or new 
positions, by hiring employees with complementary expertise (Traavikutvalget, 
2012:23). According to the developed indicators, these insights from knowledgeable 
external sources provide evidence that the organization has raised its level of expertize 
significantly over the last decade, among other through improved recruitment 
processes and an increased focus on analysis. 
 
This is also confirmed by the figures and numbers of staffing within the organization. 
At the end of 2011, a total of 45 positions at the Central Unit were associated with 
various analytical functions such as strategic analysis and threat assessment. 
According to the Traavik Commission, most of these analytical tasks have been 
established over the last decade, and the scope of the work has steadily increased 
during this period. The number of analysts at the Central Unit has more than tripled 
since 2002, and the commission notes that the analytical capacities have become 
highly important for the work of the organization (Traavikutvalget, 2012:32). From 
2002 to 2011, the total NPSS staffing increased by 55%. In 2009, the staff included 
around 60 people with various educations at master’s level, and by 2011, 30% of the 
personnel had background from outside the police. The total number of educated 
specialists by then amounted to 15%, compared with 8% in 2002 (Traavikutvalget, 
2012:5, 11; Holme, 2009:174). 
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In relation to sources that demonstrate the competency requirements and job 
advertisements of the NPSS, the public webpage of the service currently states that the 
service has a multidisciplinary working environment which strives for openness and 
interdisciplinary collaboration. Further, the webpage clearly reflects a broad approach 
to recruitment; 
 
Our responsibilities require that employees have different and varied expertise. Our 
required competence changes with the society. Our staffs come from very different 
educational backgrounds. The NPSS has everything from police officers to employees 
with training in social sciences, law, finance, information technology, engineering, 
language, history, psychology and religion. Our employee’s also have very diverse 
professional experience (PST, n.d. a, own translation). 
 
For the service to be effective, it is furthermore emphasized that an increasingly 
diverse society needs to be met by an equal diversity in the attitudes, values, and 
perspectives of employees within the service (PST, n.d. a). Over the later years, the 
NPSS have been present at several career fairs, such as those held at the University of 
Oslo. These are arenas where job seekers and newly educated can meet with potential 
future employers to learn out about their career opportunities. Again, this clearly 
reflects an awareness and active effort toward attaining the required level of 
multidisciplinary expertize. 
 
A need for continued efforts 
Although external sources such as the Traavik Commission recognize these efforts of 
the NPSS to broaden its expertise, it is also emphasized a continued room for 
improvement in this area (Traavikutvalget, 2012:32). Notably, the amount of 
multidisciplinary expertise is currently 19% lower than the organization’s Swedish 
counterpart, Säpo - an organization which tasks mostly are similar to those of the 
NPSS. According to the Traavik Commission, this indicates that the organization has 
in fact not managed to broaden its expertise sufficiently over recent years, even though 
this has been a stated objective of the organization throughout the past decade. The 
commission-report therefore restates the importance that the organization needs to take 
determined measures for further strengthening the broader expertise among its 
employees. More generally, the commission also notes that the NPSS has not given the 
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required priority to human resource development (HRD). In the commission’s view, 
intense efforts are required in this area, including the development of an overall HRD-
strategy (Traavikutvalget, 2012:5, 47). These deficiencies are, according to the 
commission, also evident at the level of management, where one needs to work more 
actively to develop leadership and recruit leaders with diverse professional and 
academic backgrounds. Currently, the majority of NPSS leaders are recruited from 
within the service, and the last Leadership Development Program in NPSS was 
concluded around 2006. This program involved all leaders within the organization, 
including those in the local units, but since then, there has been no targeted effort to 
develop leadership. Attaining the required leadership and broader expertise is in the 
commission’s view regarded one of the major challenges of the NPSS 
(Traavikutvalget, 2012:20, 47). 
 
The service prepared a strategic HRD-plan for the period 2009-2012, but according to 
the Traavik Commission, this plan has not been updated over the recent years. A new 
plan was initiated in 2013, and the service intends to develop a strategic 3-5 year plan 
from 2014 (Traavikutvalget, 2012:47).  
 
Summary 
The data material reflects high awareness within the organization of the need to 
increase the multidisciplinary expertize and recruit actively and broadly – as 
demonstrated through the public webpages and statements from knowledgeable 
sources such as Jørn Holme. Recruitment of multidisciplinary expertise has been a 
formally stated objective of the organization throughout the last decade, and from the 
sources identified in this study, one finds that the organization has developed 
significantly in the right direction compared to the status a decade ago. The number of 
educated specialist has nearly doubled from 2002 to 2011, while the number of 
analysts at the Central Unit has more than tripled - although from a quite modest level 
initially. However, in comparison to similar services of neighboring countries, it is still 
a question whether development has been sufficient. Especially noteworthy is it that 
the organization lags significantly behind from its Swedish counterpart, a service 
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which largely has the same tasks as the NPSS. Furthermore, the sources highlight a 
general lack in the strategic effort toward HRD in the NPSS, which could imply that 
personnel are not challenged with new perspectives and therefore remain rooted in 
cemented ways of thinking about threats. Although the service seems to be well on the 
way toward becoming a fundamentally multidisciplinary “knowledge organization”, is 
seems to be required a continued effort in this area, both with regard to recruitment as 
well as internal development of competence. 
 
Potential drivers for change 
The security environment and more specifically, the complexities in the threat 
scenario, can clearly be regarded a driver for change in this area. Central actors within 
and outside the organization perceived that the organization had to adapt in order to 
perform its tasks well under a new threat scenario. One might furthermore say that the 
management was faced with a kind of “crisis” in the wake of the Lund Commission-
report, which added urgency to the efforts. External reviews, such as that of the Lund 
Commission might therefore have been essential in order to generate the sufficient 
awareness that something had to be done. The potential driving effect of external input 
is also supported in the findings of the Traavik Commission which highlights that the 
externally oriented parts of the organization seem to have developed more in a positive 
direction. It seems that the areas of the organization which are regularly under review 
by other actors have developed a culture for continuous improvement, among others 
by taking advantage of the opportunities that lie in vacant or new positions. In 
addition, Sefland’s determined measures during the early 2000s clearly indicate that 
sound leadership and direction from the top of the organization gave thrust to the first 
efforts of moving the organization in a more multidisciplinary direction. 
  
Potential barriers for change 
When Sefland initiated the first efforts toward broader recruitments, sources indicate 
that this initiative was met with some resistance internally. Organizational theory 
points to several reasons for resistance against change, most of these are related to the 
established cultures within the organization (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2007:362-363). 
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Before the efforts of Sefland, the NPSS was heavily criticized for its closed culture, 
and many officials had then worked in the service over a long period of time. On this 
note, the Danielsen Committee argued that this stability in staffing could have lead to 
unproductive and cemented cultures. Research has demonstrated that employees of the 
same educational background will tend to ally with each other and develop an 
inclination to act and think alike within the organization. If the formal regulations of 
the organization conflicts with these developed standards, the trend is that employees 
will act according to their own developed standards, rather than the formally stated 
standards of the organization (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2007:141). As most leaders are 
recruited from within the service, one could furthermore ask to what extent 
recruitment officers and leaders have a preference toward hiring police educated staff. 
For a service which historically has been a police organization, such self-reinforcing 
trends might indeed represent a barrier for fundamentally altering the actual 
recruitment of the service – an issue which often referred to as “path dependency”. As 
indicated by the Traavik Commission, there might exist internal variations between the 
various units, where certain units have developed a better culture for managing these 
changes than others, and to utilize new employments to supply the service with 
complementary expertize. However, in common for these units, is that they have a 
more extrovert role where their work is regularly reviewed by external actors which 
bring important correctives to the service. This might seem to support the hypothesis 
of path-dependency as a barrier in the more shrouded and introvert unit of the 
organization. With limited empirical support, this discussion will here only amount to 
speculations. Still, in closed organizations such as the NPSS these are indeed highly 
plausible barriers which deserve further examination and attention. 
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4.2.Proactive 
 
 
Strategic command and outlook 
The recommendations of the Danielsen Committee emphasized that Norwegian 
interest in general had become more vulnerable to terrorism and sabotage and that the 
NPSS therefore had to be flexible with ability to adapt and plan towards the unknown 
(Justis- og politidepartementet, 1998). In August 2004, Jørn Holme was appointed 
Chief of the NPSS for a fixed term of six years - a period in which the organization 
was to undertake several significant changes. In 2005, Holme suggested adjustments to 
the structure of the NPSS which was endorsed by the MoJ. The ministry added that the 
new organization had to be open, flexible, and offer good opportunities for ad-hoc 
organization of projects. Specifically, these changes implied that analysis and 
consultancy was strengthened considerably and that investigations were separated 
from intelligence and other preventive activities (PST, 2012; PST, n.d.). In an attempt 
to strengthen the strategic command of the service, Holme established a secretariat 
comprising experts within law, social science and policing. According to the Traavik 
commission, this secretariat took a central role for planning in relation to strategic 
trends and emerging threats. In perspective of the established indicators for 
proactivity, this provides evidence of organizational amendments which facilitated a 
more strategic outlook within the organization. However, after Holme left the position 
as chief in 2009 this secretariat function was discontinued. In this relation, the 
commission argues that the re-establishment of such a unit could represent an 
important contribution for ensuring that the NPSS increasingly focuses the overall 
strategic trends and new emerging threats (Traavikutvalget, 2012:19-20). More 
Intelligence organizations need to be proactive and strategic in order to predict and unveil 
future threats and to understand their underlying causes in order to suggest preventative 
measures, including the ability to change focus and alter direction. 
 
Indicators: 
 Statements of strategic perspective and attention to new threats 
 Stated focus on root-causes 
 Evidence of prevented threats 
 Legal provisions or organizational amendments  
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generally, the commission argues that the Central Unit in Oslo largely stagnated after 
2006, resulting in suboptimal performance. 
 
Among the main problems is unsatisfactory cooperation and coordination between 
units and an excessive focus on the ongoing cases. In some situations, this may result 
in tunnel vision and cause that too little attention is given to the totality of threats and 
new emerging threats (Traavikutvalget, 2012:15, own translation). 
 
Furthermore, the commission notes that; 
 
The NPSS is still characterized by a static, tradition-bound organizational culture 
which not sufficiently emphasize and honors development, creativity and innovation. 
In the commissions view, this is perhaps the biggest challenge of the NPSS. In other 
words: the service has focused too much on the ongoing cases, and not sufficiently 
toward circumstances outside these cases. The service has lacked the ability to look up 
and capture patterns and changes within the big picture (Traavikutvalget, 2012:3, own 
translation). 
 
In a situation where the threat scenario is becoming increasingly complex, a lack of 
strategic perspective heightens the risk of emerging threats going unnoticed. 
According to the commission, this is particularly evident at the higher levels of 
command within the NPSS. The leadership team is said to have placed too much 
emphasis on the ongoing cases and has therefore not been able to exercise the strategic 
change management which is required. This narrow focus is also intensified by the 
management-dialogue with the MoJ, where questions of a general or strategic political 
character are not discussed to any significant degree (Traavikutvalget, 2012:3-4).  
 
The 2012 internal evaluation of the NPSS goes far to confirm that the management-
dialogue has mainly revolved around budget situations and orientations about ongoing 
cases. Therefore, there has been absence of dialogue on strategic developments and 
circumstances which falls outside the scope of the prioritized issues (PST, 2012:30-
31). 
 
These insights seem to indicate that the service has in fact not managed maintain the 
strategic perspective which is required in order to recognize potential new and 
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emerging issues in the broader threat environment. The external review from the 
Traavik Commission emphasizes that the service is dominated by a static and 
tradition-bound culture which hinders development in this area. This might indeed be 
closely related to the issue of path-dependency. Moreover, the commission highlights 
a fundamental lack of strategic leadership both within the organization as well as from 
the MoJ, thereby causing a narrow tunnel vision which heightens the risk of emerging 
threats going unnoticed. This indicates that sound direction and leadership is highly 
important in order to maintain the required strategic outlook, especially for an 
organization which is generally protected from other external correctives. 
 
Difficult priorities within information-gathering 
While the lack of strategic perspective seems closely related to matters of leadership, 
the data material also points toward internal struggles and resulting unproductive 
priorities. The NPSS has, in similar to other security and intelligence services, 
experienced that the amount of information has increased dramatically over the recent 
years. This upsurge is caused by a number of factors; technological developments 
which provide greater opportunities to obtain information, access to new and covert 
methods, and the Internet emerging as an increasingly important intelligence platform 
to mention a few. This presents the NPSS with some serious dilemmas in terms of 
what information to collect.  
 
The service continuously needs to collect information to the ongoing cases and to the 
assessments it provides to a variety of decision-makers, but equally important, it needs 
to proactively gather information that could shed light on potential new emerging 
security threats. However, these objectives usually entail very different types of 
information (Traavikutvalget, 2013:23-24). NPSS-analysts are commonly placed 
either in the Department for Analysis or in the Operative Department. Analysts in the 
latter department spend most time working with the ongoing cases, while the 
Department for Analysis focuses on national threat assessments, thematic reports and 
other types of strategic decision support – which often of a more long-term 
perspective. The analysts in the two departments therefore usually have very different 
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information needs. Analysts at the Department for Analysis is entirely dependent that 
the Operative Department – which holds the main functions for information gathering 
- gives priority and allocates sufficient resources for collection to meet their 
information needs. Such strategic information gathering may in some cases involve 
operations over an extended period of time, targeting developments or environments 
which to the work of the Operative Department often may appear improbable or 
irrelevant (Traavikutvalget, 2012:26). Access to information regarding developments 
which so far has not been perceived as threatening could prove essential in order to 
detect and prevent a future threat. Still, in a pressured situation, this is usually not 
given sufficient priority in the Operative Department. The information needs of the 
Department for Analysis is therefore crushed under the need for information to the 
ongoing cases, with the consequence that the quality of the strategic assessments 
deteriorates (Traavikutvalget, 2012:22, 26, 32). This indicates that, although there is 
awareness for the need to focus on strategic trends in certain parts of the organization, 
this does not necessarily account for the organization as a whole. 
 
While this to a certain extent is a question of resource-imposed priorities, it also 
indicates the existence of potentially unhealthy subcultures and internal struggles 
within the organization. As noted by the Traavik Commission, each employee seems 
to identify too much with his own department, and too little with the organization as a 
whole (Traavikutvalget, 2012:3-4). This might follow from the high degree of 
specialization within the NPSS which may result that employees regard their own 
tasks more important than other tasks within the organization (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 
2007:140). In a situation where the Operative Department controls information 
gathering, one can therefore easily imagine that information needs in other parts of the 
organization are given lower priority. 
 
More generally, both the July 22 Commission and the Traavik Commission highlights 
that the two departments seem little aligned for the further development of the 
organization. There are also ambiguities in the roles of the departments, which 
occasionally results in duplication of effort. Considering that there are not enough 
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resources to meet all the information needs of the services at any time it is also here a 
question of strategic leadership to define what areas and developments that should be 
given priority and attention (Traavikutvalget, 2012:26, 32; 22. juli-kommisjonen, 
2012:385). However, as noted previously, it may seem that such leadership has been 
missing. 
 
When NPSS-leadership make these priorities it is essential that the decision above all 
is based on the service's overarching goals, and to less extent the individual 
department’s preferences. (…) The Committee believes it is vital that the NPSS 
devotes greater attention toward obtaining information about trends and developments 
which are not necessarily considered probable, such as underlying, potential or 
emerging threats (Traavikutvalget, 2012:26-27, own translation). 
 
Both the Traavik-led commission and the July 22 Commission agree that the NPSS 
has significant potential for improvement in terms of processes for collection and 
management of a rising amount of information - arguing this should be a priority for 
the future (Traavikutvalget, 2012:24). This view is largely shared by the organization 
itself, where the NPSS internal evaluation reads; 
 
The evaluation has revealed capacity issues with handling and assessing the large 
amount of information the service receives every day, and with making complete 
registrations and analyzes of people and events outside the ongoing cases (PST, 
2012:30, own translation). 
 
From the NPSS’ internal investigation it is evident that the service today is forced to 
prioritize and work case oriented within the narrow range where existing threats are 
identified. Therefore, it is a challenge to generate the sufficient support for 
intelligence-based work outside the ongoing cases, and the effort to analyze trends and 
threat-related issues such as radicalization, travel activities, propaganda or capacity 
building, is therefore less extensive and less structured than suggested by today’s 
threat situation. According to the evaluation, these challenges are particularly 
noticeable in dealing with threats from solo-terrorist, such as the perpetrator on 22/7. 
Managing such complex threats clearly requires more effort outside the established 
threats and ongoing cases than what is the case today (PST, 2012:30). As noted in the 
self-evaluation; 
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We see that the NPSS, due to resources and the way work processes are organized, is 
operating with a considerable degree of uncertainty in order to not identify new 
threats. The service is working very systematic and thorough in ongoing cases, but 
does not have the same systematics and attention to circumstances outside these cases. 
If nothing is changed, the degree of uncertainty will increase as a result of the 
developments within a gradually more complex and changeable threat scenario (PST, 
2012:31, own translation). 
 
From the sources in this section it appears that the service has not managed to attain 
the strategic and proactive formula which required for detecting potential new and 
emerging threats. While external sources draw attention to deficient leadership and 
narrow priorities within information gathering, internal sources frequently highlight 
resources as a barrier for the proactive effort of the NPSS. 
 
Narrow priorities – a question of resources? 
The analysis will not go into depth on numbers and budgets, but the resource situation 
undeniably deserves some attention as it, according to the service, has led to frequent 
and very difficult priorities (PST, 2012:30). Under Janne Kristiansen, who led the 
NPSS through three years until 2012, efforts to prevent and prevent terrorism from 
militant Islamist groups had the number one priority. Although some have criticized 
this one-sided focus, Kristiansen withholds that this priority was necessary and correct 
(22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:355; Stortinget, 2012). In response to criticism about the 
limited focus at uncovering new threats, Kristiansen noted to the Storting in 2012: 
 
In my view, this is a question of needed priorities, based on the threat situation we 
saw, and in light of a difficult resource situation (Stortinget, 2012, own translation). 
 
Both Holme and Kristiansen express concern over a generally tight resource situation 
in terms of both investigation and prevention, resulting in tough priorities every day 
(Stortinget, 2012). In the graded self-evaluation, the NPSS described its resource 
situation as “critical”, highlighting that this has multiple and serious consequences for 
the preventive efforts. Specifically, the service is not able to devote considerable effort 
toward collection and analysis of information outside the high-priority cases. 
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Therefore, the organization as a whole is largely deprived of the ability to 
systematically and over time build an understanding of developments in the broader 
threat environment (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:382; Stormark, 2013a). 
 
Since 9/11, the NPSS have generally been high on the priorities of the political 
Norway, resulting that budgets have increased steadily (Østgaard, 2012:8). Still, there 
is little doubt that a fundamentally proactive effort would place great demands on the 
resources of the service. Kjetil Stormark argues that the service will need at least 100-
150 more employees in order to gain capacity to unveil new threats at an early stage 
(Stormark, 2013a). Both the July 22 Commission and the Traavik Commission found 
that the resource situation might pose a barrier for the effort of the service. Still, they 
both emphasize that the NPSS probably can get considerably more out of their current 
resources. In this relation, it is underlined that the calls for increased resources should 
not stand in the way of the significant improvements which in fact can be implemented 
without the supply of additional funding (Traavikutvalget, 2012:44; 22. juli-
kommisjonen, 2012:393). Knut Fosli at the MoJ argues that the NPSS has not been 
sufficiently proactive in the efforts to develop its own organization. He finds that the 
service often respond to new challenges by asking for more resources, rather than 
focusing on how the organization itself can adapt in response to its new premises 
(Fosli, 2012:11). Adjustments in leadership, culture, methods and work processes 
represent only some of the initiatives which might improve the priorities and guide the 
focus of employee’s attention without extensive use of resources. The current Chief of 
the NPSS, Marie Benedicte Bjørnland, largely confirms this view. She argues that 
there is great potential for further developing the methods for preventing threats, and 
that much can be done within the existing framework (Norges Politilederlag, 2013). 
 
The dilemma between intelligence and individual rights 
Any discussion of proactivity from the side of intelligence agencies cannot be 
detached from the legal and ethical foundations for the agencies effort. Not 
surprisingly, the legal constraints on the NPSS are a recurring theme in the data 
material of this study. In 1999, the Norwegian Government appointed the so-called 
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Sårbarhetsutvalget - a committee mandated to assess the vulnerabilities of the 
Norwegian society. The following year, the committee presented a series of 
recommendations in order to strengthen efforts toward community security and 
preparedness. Among its recommendations, the committee stated that: 
 
It should be established legal provisions that provide the NPSS with opportunities for 
offensive preventive efforts (Sårbarhetsutvalget, 2000:14, own translation). 
 
Although new laws have been introduced over the last decade, sources indicate that the 
legal basis might still remain a constraining factor for the NPSS to fulfill its duties 
according to expectations. Specifically, the service itself argues that the existing legal 
framework is insufficient to deal with threats from new issues such as solo-terrorism 
(22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:392). Still, considering the fundamental values of the 
Norwegian society, one could also ask whether it is desirable to set the NPSS capable 
of doing so. This draws attention to several enduring tradeoffs - related to the balance 
between openness and security, between trust and control, and between the 
governments need for surveillance and the individual’s right for freedom. According to 
the July 22 Commission, the democratic costs will be too big if the ambition is 
eliminating any threat to the society. In other words, the society will always have to 
tolerate a certain amount of risk. Furthermore, the commission notes that today’s legal 
framework already reflects the Parliament’s balancing of the dilemma between 
surveillance and individual rights (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:450).  
 
Back in 2005, the Norwegian Parliament addressed recommendations of a committee 
mandated to examine the methods of the Norwegian police. This resulted in an 
expansion of methods, and the door was now opened for methods which previously 
only associated with investigations, to also be used in relation to preventive activities. 
The rationale behind these changes was to improve the odds to prevent and avert 
terrorism and other serious threats on an earlier stage than what had previously been 
possible (PST, n.d.). These new legal provisions can be seen in relation to a general 
trend in which Norwegian security took a more proactive form after 2001. Before the 
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9/11-attacks, the Norwegian Government combated terrorism exclusively within a 
juridical model, where acts of terrorism were punished through ordinary provisions 
such as deliberate murder, violence, vandalism, or threats to national security. This 
meant that the action had to be completed in order for it to be punished, and naturally, 
it could then no longer be prevented by the means available to the NPSS. After 2001 
however, the Norwegian approach to such acts took a far broader approach, whereas 
terrorism also received its own penal provision in Norwegian law. The changes gave 
the NPSS access to preventive methods in order to uncover and, if possible, prevent 
serious attacks on the nation in the unfolding, and before the act itself was committed. 
This legal base separate the NPSS from the regular police and provides the service 
with unique preventative responsibilities (Holme, 2009:172, 182; Bergersen, 2012:54-
55, 59).  
 
In perspective of the developed indicators, this demonstrates that the NPSS over the 
last decade has received new legal provisions to facilitate a more proactive effort of 
intelligence. In 2009, Jørn Holme revealed that around 70% of the resources were 
dedicated to the preventive activities of the service, including proactive efforts to 
prevent conditions which might radicalize young people into militant Islamist groups 
(Holme, 2009:179). Holme argues that the new methods adopted in 2005 were 
important in many cases and contributed to prevent different types of attacks on 
Norwegian security (Stortinget, 2012). These statements not only provide evidence 
that the new legal provisions contributed to impede threats, they also indicate that the 
NPSS focuses on the root-causes of threats and work proactively in order to avert 
potential threats from becoming real. 
 
According to Holme, the expansion in the legal framework was to withstand both 
“good and bad days”, indicating that there are indeed limits for how far one can push 
the methods for surveillance and intelligence in a democracy. Looking back to 2005, 
Holme noted to the Norwegian Parliament in 2012;   
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Would we, contrary to expectation, experience a terrorist attack, the NPSS-chief 
should not demand new and comprehensive legislation for monitoring. These had 
already been given (Stortinget, 2012, own translation). 
 
While this might indicate that equilibrium has been found, there is little doubt that 
developments within IT have presented the service with new challenges when it comes 
to uncovering threats. In this relation, the July 22 Commission recommends that the 
existing regulations for intrusive methods such as monitoring should have its parallel 
in a regulation for the efforts in cyberspace (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:460). The 
service itself has expressed concern that today’s regulatory framework does not take in 
account the need for effective methods for IT-based information gathering, and when 
it comes to collecting and storing information from open sources, the regulation is 
claimed to be inadequate and not adapted to the current situation (St. meld. nr. 21, 
2012-2013:46). The July 22 Commission argue that the objective of protection against 
terrorism might justify certain new legal provisions, granting the NPSS access to 
further information-gathering and sharing. However, it is stressed that the restrictions 
set in respect of democracy and privacy need to be preserved (St. meld. nr. 21, 2012-
2013:48).  
 
Clearly, the data material suggests that ambiguities and lack of development in the 
regulatory framework might have constrained the proactive effort to uncover threats, 
especially with regard to IT-based collection and analysis of information. However, 
sources also indicate that internal factors have detained this effort. 
 
Outdated methods and working-procedures 
In 2012, Minister of Justice Grete Faremo, pointed out that the NPSS itself had 
indicated that the service “did not see the Internet emerging as such an important 
information channel as it has proven to be”. In an interview with the July 22 
Commission, Faremo notes that the NPSS self-evaluation following 22/7 illustrates an 
organization which has continued too long in established working procedures. Faremo, 
which newly arrived from the position as Minister of Defense, believes that the sharp 
missions of the Norwegian Armed Forces is what literally brought the foreign 
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intelligence service “up on its toes" in terms of required competence, methods, and the 
need to understand evolvements in the threat environment. She argues that even 
though the NPSS has done a good job, it might have been more sheltered than the NIS 
in terms of realizing the tough requirements for its organization (Faremo, 2012:9). To 
take the Internet as an example - representing a huge source of information about 
activities in the community, the NIS was early to establish a sophisticated special unit 
for so-called open-source intelligence. The NPSS however, has lagged behind in this 
development, and it was only until 2010 that the service established a unit for digital 
information retrieval. This indicates that the service has been slow to undertake the 
necessary organizational amendments to facilitate a more proactive effort. The 
commission believes that the service, even before receiving the earmarked allocations, 
should have given higher priority to open-source intelligence than what has been the 
case. Therefore, significant efforts are now required in order to appear relevant in light 
of developments in this area (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:390). With regard to barriers 
for development, the lack of crises and external incentives might have resulted that the 
methods of service has somewhat stagnated. Although the threat of terrorism against 
Norway has been acknowledged as steadily increasing, there had prior to 22/7 been no 
terrorist attacks or significant crises on Norwegian soil. Just like external shocks or 
crises might be a driving force for development, its absence might in this case have 
hindered the progress toward developing the new and necessary methods. 
 
According to the Traavik Commission, the NPSS should give higher priority to 
developing its preventive methods within the existing legal framework. The 
commission acknowledges that there are ongoing efforts to develop methods in 
important parts of the service, but still suggests that the preventive methods of the 
NPSS are not sufficiently innovative and proactive (Traavikutvalget, 2012:31). 
 
For the NPSS to be an effective security service, the service's preventative activities 
needs to be based on a wide range of measures, or - if you will - a comprehensive 
toolkit. The Committee considers it utmost important that NPSS continuously develop 
both its overt and covert preventative activities (Traavikutvalget, 2012:31, own 
translation). 
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It is recommended that the service should devote sufficient resources and establish 
good processes in order to maximize propulsion in this effort. The commission 
believes that a stronger focus in this area will contribute to enhance the results and 
reputation of the NPSS (Traavikutvalget, 2012:31).  
 
A culture of precaution 
The revelations of the Lund Commission delivered an uppercut to the reputation of the 
NPSS, and according to several observers, this has contributed to what can be termed a 
culture of precaution within the service. Addressing the Storting in 2012, Janne 
Kristiansen emphasized that it is decisive for a security service to stay within the legal 
framework which is set, but equally is it important to capitalize on the potential that 
the framework offers the service. Kristiansen states she was aware of the so-called 
culture of precaution which had developed in the wake of the Lund Commission's 
report in 1996, and claim that specific measures were implemented in order to 
counteract this culture. Jørn Holme notes that the Lund Commission represented a 
close reminder of an overenthusiastic intelligence service, which often did too much 
rather than too little. Following the scandals, the Storting strengthened the EOS 
Committee considerably, including regular inspections of the methods, registrations 
and monitoring of the service. In this relation, Holme states that: 
 
The NPSS was often criticized for legally unauthorized registrations, and I cannot 
disregard that this might have contributed to a culture of precaution in order to avoid 
criticism (Stortinget, 2012, own translation). 
 
Both Holme and Kristiansen argue that the strong monitoring from the EOS 
Committee and the resulting fear of being held responsible to criticism might have 
caused that personnel did not dare to register information into the systems. As 
Kritiansen puts it: 
 
The organization wants to do things correctly. It is about very competent, but also very 
decent people, who want to do their job within the rules that are set, and who think it 
is tough being criticized for having done wrong. Therefore, one seeks to do everything 
correctly, and in such cases it is only human to retreat a little (Stortinget, 2012, own 
translation). 
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These statements indicate that the tight external control of the service, might also pose 
a barrier when it comes to developing the proactivity which required in today’s 
complex threat environment. It seems that the fear of criticism from the environment 
has nurtured an unfortunate culture within the organization, meaning that the service is 
not able to capitalize on the potential offered within the existing legal framework. As 
highlighted by Morten Ruud, the consequence of this culture might be that the NPSS 
disregard developments which should have been captured (Ruud, 2012:10). In this 
relation, the July 22 Commission states that it is particularly important that the service 
exhibit greater determination, creativity and willingness to identify new threats (22. 
juli-kommisjonen, 2012:459). Holme claim that the service should review the 
regulations and perhaps consider lowering the bar for registrations in order to be able 
to capture disturbing developments relating to issues and persons which are not 
previously recognized as actual threats (Stortinget, 2012). Marie Benedicte Bjørnland, 
acknowledges that the repeated criticism of the service has impacted the culture of the 
organization, but she also argues that dealing with this fundamentally is a question of 
leadership (Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:46). Leaders of organizations may take a 
number of concrete measures in order to develop and affect organizational culture, and 
lack of such leadership might in this regard be considered a potential obstacle to 
development (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2007:134-136). 
 
Summary 
The material largely reflects an internal awareness of the need to be proactive and 
focus on strategic trends and the fundamental causes of potential threats. This is 
especially highlighted through statements of past and current leaders of the service. 
Still, both the internal and external sources indicate that the NPSS has not managed to 
adapt sufficiently according to this requirement. More specifically, it is shown that the 
service, due to inadequate leadership, unbalanced priorities and unproductive cultures, 
has not managed to devote sufficient attention to the strategic picture and potential 
new and emerging threats. Within the service, is seems that resources are often 
regarded the main challenge for developing a more proactive and strategic outlook, 
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while other sources generally underline that much can be done within the existing 
conditions. Regardless of the causes, the sources seem to be aligned that the current 
methods, perspectives and procedures are not as proactive as the current threat 
scenario would suggest. Although certain legal ambiguities remain, especially with 
regard to IT-based intelligence, the material reflects that the service has not capitalized 
on the potential of the legal framework. All in all, this heightens the risk that new and 
emerging threats might go unnoticed. 
 
Potential drivers for change 
From the material it appears that the threat scenario is the principal catalyst for the 
increased awareness of the need for a proactive and strategic effort. In addition, the 
introduction of new laws and regulations has clearly contributed to a more proactive 
effort, which according to the leaders, has contributed to avert several potential threats 
against the Norwegian society. Structural amendments might also contribute to the 
maintenance of the organization´s strategic outlook, as witnessed in the secretariat 
function which was established under Holmes leadership, but which later was 
dissolved. According to the Traavik Commission, this unit contributed to lift the 
perspectives within the organization toward strategic trends and developments –
thereby increasing the odds for observing new, emerging threats. According to Grete 
Faremo, “sharp missions” was a catalyst which in time brought the NIS “up on its 
toes”. But since the NPSS traditionally has been more sheltered from such external 
motivations, the organization has not realized the tough requirements that are placed 
upon the organization today. This indicates that the absence external motivations have 
caused stagnation within the NPSS. In this relation, external shocks and crises such as 
22/7 might represent a driving force for developing a more proactive organization. 
 
Potential barriers for change 
The material indicates several potential barriers for developing a fundamentally 
proactive effort within the NPSS. In general it indicates a tendency where internal 
sources highlight resources and legal constrains as their greatest barriers, while 
external sources generally emphasize matters concerning leadership and culture. 
58 
 
Leaders of the service have expressed great concern over a critical resource situation 
which forces the service to work narrowly and case-oriented, thus reducing the 
attention towards identifying new developments and emerging threats. Furthermore, 
the NPSS argues that the existing legal framework is insufficient to deal with threats 
from new issues such as solo-terrorism. On the other hand, the external reviews after 
22/7 and several other sources emphasize that the service should do more to develop 
its processes within the boundaries of the existing legal framework, and that calls for 
increased resources should not stand in the way of the significant improvements which 
in fact can be implemented without the supply of additional funding. 
 
The external sources also emphasize that the organization has lacked the strategic 
leadership which is required both within the organization and in the dialogue with the 
MoJ. The lack of strategic leadership and direction from the top of the organization 
might to some extent result that the various departments, dominated by diverging 
focus and perspectives, are left to “battle it out” with regard to where resources should 
be used and which issues deserve the focus of the organization. The result seems to be 
that some tasks are offered significant attention while others go largely ignored. This 
internal fight for resources might be closely related to the high degree of specialization 
which naturally follows these types of organizations. Within the various departments, 
employees devote their efforts to narrowly defined tasks and usually seem to engage 
little with those matters that are not related to their own responsibilities and 
assignments. The departments will naturally orientate toward information that is 
relevant to their business and ignore everything else. Employees therefore end up 
weighing their own task as more important than other (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 
2007:139-140). The external sources indicate that the focus today is largely based on 
the preferences of individual departments, rather than the overarching goals of the 
service. This might not only lead to biased priorities or duplication of efforts, but also 
result in a situation where the various departments are not aligned with regard to the 
future direction of organization - which as also noted by the Traavik Commission.  
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External sources also emphasize the organization´s generally static and tradition-
bound organizational culture, an issue that might be closely related to the issue of 
path-dependency discussed in the previous section. More generally, this implies that 
new initiatives to develop the organization are not sufficiently emphasized and valued. 
This might also be a reason why the external reviews find that little attention is 
devoted to expand the methods and perspectives of the service within the existing legal 
framework. Furthermore, several sources draw attention to the so-called “post-Lund 
syndrome”, denoting the fear of criticism and corrections from the EOS Committee. In 
this way, external input might in fact also have adverse consequences for the culture of 
the organization, in this case resulting in the service not being able to capitalize on the 
potential offered within the legal framework. Still, certain internal and external sources 
emphasize that this barrier is something which should and could be managed through 
sound leadership. 
 
The material indicates that the legal framework, although developed significantly in 
the post-9/11 period, still needs to be revisited. This is especially relevant when it 
comes to collection and analysis of information on new arenas such as the Internet. 
However, due to the enduring tradeoffs between freedom and security, the legal 
boundaries of a democratic society like Norway will to some extent always present 
barriers for the proactive efforts of the intelligence services. Certain sources, such as 
Holme, seem to indicate that equilibrium already has been found, and that extensive 
new provisions might imply too big democratic costs. 
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4.3.Open and transparent 
 
 
Determined steps toward openness 
After the Danielsen report in 1998, initial steps were taken in order to make the NPSS 
more open and transparent towards the society. The report emphasized that NPSS in 
general should display greater transparency on threat scenarios, tasks and activities, 
suggesting that general extracts of threat assessments should be made public. To a 
greater extent than before, it should now be openly expressed which activities and 
what environments that receive the attention of NPSS. It was also recommended that 
the grading practices within the service should be reviewed (PST, 2002; Justis- og 
politidepartementet, 1998). In 2002, an information unit was established for the 
purpose of internal and external communication, and the NPSS started releasing an 
abridged public version of the annual threat assessment in order to offer society insight 
into its work and effort (PST, 2002; PST, 2012b). This demonstrates that the service 
early in the 2000s took determined steps toward more openness. Furthermore, it 
indicates that external reviews might represent a central driver for developing more 
openness, in this case represented by the Danielsen Committee. 
 
After appointed Chief of the NPSS in 2004, Jørn Holme became a central advocate for 
increased openness, resulting in the service gradually appearing as more visible and 
willing to share information with the general public. By 2008, the service was present 
and available on social platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, thus enabling a more 
regular communication with the media and society (Holme, 2009:175-177). During his 
leadership, Holme invited the press inside NPSS headquarters, participated in public 
The intelligence organizations need to be as open and transparent as possible, in order to 
maintain community confidence in their efforts. 
 
Indicators: 
 Stated awareness and clear strategy for openness 
 Active communication 
 Information is easy accessible 
 Public appearances 
 Declassification of information 
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debates, and announced the actual number of people the service was following closely. 
With respect to the developed indicators for openness, this demonstrates both active 
communication and more public appearances from the side of the service. Due to his 
efforts for opening the service toward the society, Holme was in 2007 assigned the 
Award of Communication from the Norwegian Communication Association 
(Nettavisen, 2009; Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2010). Holme argues that the 
new openness was important in order to restore the confidence in the work of the 
service, and to build trust and legitimacy in the broader population. He underlines that 
trust is decisive for the effort of the NPSS, as it allows for communication with 
individuals (Holme, 2009:165). This indicates that the increased openness is more than 
a mere response to the calls of the society, but also a conscious strategy for achieving 
one of the benefits of community confidence, namely access to information – one of 
the central preconditions for effective intelligence. In this relation, Holme initiated a 
reputation survey in 2008 that revealed the NPSS good reputation and high confidence 
among the public. According to Holme, these were welcome results which 
demonstrated that the conscious transformation with emphasis on openness and 
transparency had paid off (Holme, 2009:181). 
 
Continued openness – contradictions and challenges 
In parts of the organization, the enthusiasm toward the new openness-strategy has been 
limited, and the material highlights numerous challenges on this pathway. Certain 
NPSS-officials feared that the new openness and Holme’s many public quirks could 
result in the flow of information from cooperating services drying out in the fear of 
leakages. According to former Chief of Defense, Sverre Diesen, certain officials 
within the NIS “nearly developed a rash” when hearing of the new openness-culture. 
Lasse Roen, who has been employee representative within the NPSS since 2007, 
argues that Jørn Holme did great things for the service, but also confirms that the new 
culture was a root of concern within the organization (Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:46). 
Increased openness might clearly heighten the risk for unintended exposure of 
classified information, as seen when Janne Kristiansen in early 2012 resigned from her 
post after what has been termed “a serious breach in confidentiality” during a 
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parliamentary open hearing. Kristiansen had by then largely confirmed that the NIS 
has operators in Pakistan - a leak which undoubtedly could undermine cooperating 
services confidence in the NPSS (Nettavisen, 2012). These insights might indicate that 
while leadership and conscious strategies might represent a driving force for increased 
openness and transparency, the increased risk of compromising classified information 
may similarly breed skepticism within and outside the organization and thus hinder the 
developments in this direction. The balancing between intelligence openness and 
secrecy is clearly a topic riddled with difficult trade-offs and contradictions. 
 
In 2012, Head of Communication Martin Bernsen posted an entry titled The NPSS and 
Openness on the webpage of the service. In this entry, Bernsen largely presents the 
organization’s strategy for openness – explaining what the service can and cannot be 
open about. This can clearly be related to the indicators of active communication and 
stated awareness. Bernsen highlights that the NPSS over the last decade has moved 
from being a closed police unit to become a more open security service. 
 
Transparency about security challenges was accentuated after the terrorist attacks 
against the United States 11 September 2001 and was no less relevant for NPSS after 
the acts of terror on 22 July 2011 (PST, 2012b, own translation). 
 
Due to this development, the NPSS is now more accessible to the media and those 
using web-based social platforms. Today, the service actively operates its own 
website, in addition to being present on social media’s like Facebook, Youtube, 
Twitter and Flickr. In general, Bernsen argues that the media has played, and does 
play, a significant role for the service becoming more communicative toward the 
society - illustrated by the number of media inquiries which have skyrocketed in recent 
years. In 2004, the NPSS received about 100 media inquiries, while the same figure 
for 2011 landed at about 2000. Although inquires like these not necessarily leads to 
more transparency, Bernsen recognize them as important drivers which constantly 
challenge and stimulate the organization to a greater awareness of its communication – 
which in several cases has resulted in increased openness from the side of the service 
63 
 
(PST, 2012b). This reveals that the media can be regarded one central driver for 
increased openness. 
 
However, Bernsen also draws attention to the many dilemmas that the organization 
faces on its pathway toward transparency. In some cases, the service needs to withhold 
information which potentially can be misinterpreted or exaggerated by the media, or 
misused to perform criminal acts. In addition, legislations present a number of formal 
constraints for transparency, and there are several sensitive aspects and obstacles 
embedded in the cooperation with other countries' security services. Bernsen therefore 
underlines that communication just for the sake of communicating would be 
counterproductive - breeding confusion rather than knowledge. Therefore, the strategy 
of the NPSS is that all communication should have its purpose and take in account the 
recipient's prospect for understanding it (PST, 2012b). 
 
This generally reveals a high degree of awareness of the requirement for transparency 
within the NPSS today. Evident is also an increased ability to actually be more open, 
accessible and communicative toward the society and the media. Notably, this is 
demonstrated through the substantial engagement on web-based platforms, and more 
generally, through a rising number of public appearances and increased presence 
within the public domain. The increased openness is also reflected in the public threat 
assessments, where a quick word count reveals that the assessment for 2002 comprised 
around 1100 words, while the same assessment for 2013 counts nearly 4500 words 
(PST, 2002; PST, 2013). In similar to Holme, Bernsen points to openness as a 
conscious strategy for strengthening the community’s confidence in their effort, 
something which the organization relies on in order to perform its tasks effectively 
(PST, 2012b). This is especially relevant as that the Traavik Commission found that 
the NPSS, in certain parts of society, suffers significantly from credibility issues, 
meaning that its work is not always appreciated according to merit. Although often 
rooted in the past mistakes and controversies of the service, it is noted that the public 
debate of the NPSS tends to be more on the negative side rather than the positive. This 
is reinforced by the fact that it is difficult for the service to inform the public of its 
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achievements and results, for example when it comes to identifying and preventing 
possible terrorist attacks. The evidence for intelligence effectiveness occurs when 
successfully preventing something that has yet to happen. The persistent negative 
focus on the NPSS is often perceived as a burden for the organization’s highly 
qualified and dedicated staff, and according to the Traavik Commission, this has 
evidently contributed to the culture of precaution which discussed under the previous 
section (Traavikutvalget, 2012:9). 
 
Many NPSS-employees also feel that politicians often communicate unreasonable 
expectations for the service considering its resources and legal framework. They 
emphasize the need for clarifications which could give the public a clearer and more 
realistic understanding of what can be expected of the NPSS. On this basis, the 
Traavik Commission recommends that the government should convey a more nuanced 
picture of the possibilities and limitations in dealing with today’s threats. However, it 
is stressed that the service itself needs to contribute significantly to this effort; through 
maximum transparency and accessibility, through an offensive communication-
strategy, and through an improved utilization of the possibilities offered by the modern 
information society (Traavikutvalget, 2012:9-10). In Report No. 21 (2012-2013) to the 
Storting, the Norwegian Government agrees that the NPSS needs to be as open as 
possible regarding the conditions for its efforts as well as its performance and results 
(St. meld. nr. 21, 2012-2013:47).  
 
Based on the recommendations of the abovementioned report and the 
recommendations of the Traavik Commission, the NPSS in May 2013 decided to 
declassify and publicly display information related to the overall use of resources in 
2011 and 2012 (PST, 2013a). In relation to the indicators, this demonstrates that the 
NPSS is willing to declassify information which may be of interest to the public. 
Furthermore, the episode illustrates that external reviews and input from the 
government can be regarded potential drivers for increased openness from the service. 
 
 
65 
 
The role of the EOS Committee 
Looking back to the recommendations of the Danielsen Committee, measures were 
implemented in order to prevent future scandals like those documented by the Lund 
Commission, herein strengthening the systematic control through the EOS Committee. 
The service also developed new internal regulations, thereby tightening the control 
over operational activities to ensure that privacy and legal rights were not violated 
(Traavikutvalget, 2012:11, Holme, 2009:171-172). Since 2001, the EOS Committee’s 
annual report has offered roughly 6 pages to the scrutiny of the NPSS, mainly 
concerning the legality of methods and registrations. Although the report from the 
EOS Committee to some extent has caused more public insight into the work of the 
NPSS, Janne Kristiansen argues that these reports and the way they are made public is 
problematic. In similar to the effects of the Lund Commission’s report, she claims that 
the reports contribute to reinforce the culture of precaution within the service. 
Personally, Kristiansen claims that the requirement for openness around the service 
has gone a bit too far. She notes that, while the government calls for more 
transparency, this can also make the service vulnerable as many aspects need to be 
protected from disclosure. The service will never be able to provide the public with a 
comprehensive picture, and the small proportion of information it actually can give 
will often cause public speculations (Kristiansen, 2012:14). 
 
Summary 
There is little doubt that intelligence and openness is a relationship riddled with 
contradictions. It should be clear that openness in relation to intelligence organizations 
is not a question of full transparency. Rather it is a question of finding the right 
balance between safeguarding sensitive matters while maintaining the public trust in 
the agencies. In this sense, the analysis has found that the NPSS has come very far. 
Significant developments includes the will to be more open about the activities and 
resources of the service, the release of public threat assessments, the annual report of 
the EOS Committee, the presence in social media as well as an increasing number of 
public appearances from leaders and representatives within the service. Not 
surprisingly, the material indicates that the challenges for openness are mainly evident 
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in the nature of NPSS being a secret service with a following need to protect much of 
its information and its sources. 
 
Potential drivers for change 
The findings highlight several potential drivers for increased openness. Several 
sources underline the significant benefits that follow from openness as one driving 
force. This indicates that openness is a rational strategy based on the reasoning that 
community confidence is a precondition for intelligence which serves to increase the 
access to information. In this view, leadership effort such as the initiatives of Jørn 
Holme might provide significant thrust to such strategies. Other internal sources, such 
as Martin Bernsen, emphasize that the media undeniably plays a central role in 
pushing the service toward more openness, especially through constantly challenging 
the organization to be more aware of its communication and the need for openness. In 
addition, correctives and recommendations from external commissions and the 
government have in several cases stimulated openness, among others this was 
demonstrated by the release of annual public threat assessment following the 
recommendations from the Danielsen Committee, and the declassification of 
information based on the recommendations of the government and the Traavik 
Commission. 
 
Potential barriers for change 
With regard to openness, the material draws attention to several potential barriers for 
development. Several internal sources explain that Jørn Holme’s offensive strategy for 
openness was a root for concern within the NPSS. Some feared that the openness 
culture would risk compromising classified information, which could weaken the trust 
in NPSS as a partner and result that information from informants and cooperating 
services dried out. In certain cases, release of classified information might even be 
misused for criminal purposes. The inherent contradiction between intelligence and 
openness means that the service continuously is balancing on a knife edge. Although 
the media in general is highlighted as one of the driving forces for openness, the nature 
of mass media might also pose barriers the efforts toward openness. On some 
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occasions, the service might withhold information which are relevant to the public due 
to a fear that media might exaggerate, misinterpret or misuse the information with the 
purpose of creating headlines to sell newspapers. Openness could in such instances 
lead to public mistrust and speculations, which would be counterproductive for the 
service, meaning that the information might breed confusion and fear, rather than 
enlightenment. 
 
4.4.Close dialogue with decision-makers 
 
 
The dialogue between the MoJ and the NPSS 
Following the findings of the Danielsen Committee, it was recommended that the 
NPSS needed stronger connections with the governmental level. Specifically, the 
Committee found that; 
 
The government should increasingly take responsibility for the overall management of 
the NPSS in areas outside investigations. Ensuring that threats scenarios and the 
overall priorities of the service are established at a high political level would, in the 
committee's opinion, represent the most significant improvement and the most 
important measure in order to avoid unfortunate dispositions in the future (Justis- og 
politidepartementet, 1998, own translation). 
 
On this background, future arrangements needed to ensure that the political level in 
greater extent issued guidelines for the work of the NPSS. A model was adopted where 
the NPSS drafted an overall yearly threat assessment with the contribution of other 
actors and disciplines such as the Ministry of Defense (MoD), the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MoFA), the Defense Intelligence Staff, research establishments and several 
other relevant stakeholders. The assessment would then treated in the joint 
Intelligence services and political decision-makers need to maintain a short and clear chain 
of command. Today’s complex environment necessitates new standards for communication 
between intelligence services and a variety of political decision-makers. 
 
Indicators: 
 Clear chains of communication 
 Provides support to high-level decision-makers and the wider government 
 Government officials recognize the value of intelligence 
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collaborative Committee for Coordination and Advice (KRU), and subsequently by the 
MoJ, before submitted to the Norwegian Government’s Security Council (RSU) (PST, 
2002; Justis- og politidepartementet, 1998). As the NPSS is subordinated the MoJ, it is 
the ministry that is responsible for determining the threat level in Norway – based on 
the threat assessments of the NPSS. The service is obliged to report to the MoJ on 
“everything of importance” (Østgaard, 2012:5). With regard to indicators for 
development, this demonstrates the establishment of chains for communication 
between the NPSS and its parent ministry for the assessment of threats. 
 
In spite of the measures to strengthen the relations between the service and the 
ministerial level during the early 2000s, a study by Stein-Fredrik Kynø in 2007 
concluded that connections still seemed to be insufficient. In relevance to the indicator 
of government officials recognizing the value of intelligence, Kynø found an 
increasing awareness within the government about the ability of intelligence to provide 
support for Norway’s decision-makers. Still, he highlights that the general 
understanding and appreciation of intelligence and its potential still seemed limited 
within the political environment. Notably, to many government institutions and 
administrators, the process for obtaining access to intelligence appeared overly 
complicated and time-consuming. Furthermore, Kynø found that many politicians 
regard intelligence more as a “cloak and dagger” activity, rather than a useful and 
supportive tool in policy making. On this background, Kynø concluded that the 
Norwegian model was probably not the most efficient, and that the connection 
between executive power and the intelligence services were not close and tight enough 
to meet the security demands of the future (Kynø, 2007:76, 79-80, 82).  
 
This is also reflected in statements of intelligence researcher and former intelligence 
officer, Vegard Valther Hansen. Hansen argues that Norway fundamentally lacks the 
strategic culture where intelligence services report to the top, and that the 
understanding of threats at the higher levels therefore is limited. 
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The Norwegian intelligence services have in many ways been running their own 
business, without politicians bothering particularly. The real strategists – which 
situated at the Prime Minister’s Office and within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - 
have seldom had anything to do with the services (Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:46, own 
translation). 
 
The recent external reviews after 22/7 also indicate a continued room for improvement 
in this area. Among others, the Traavik Commission notes that: 
 
The general impression is that the Ministry of Justice has not been particularly 
concerned about how to make best possible use of the NPSS. It appears that the 
ministry lacks the necessary commissioning competence (Traavikutvalget, 2012:17, 
own translation).  
 
In other words, it is argued that the MoJ does not have the ability to define and 
describe its preferences and needs in a way that allows the NPSS to follow up in a 
satisfactory and politically relevant manner. The commission also emphasize that the 
management dialogue between the ministry and the NPSS fundamentally deficits from 
the required element of strategic leadership, and that the MoJ has not sufficiently 
contributed to strengthen coordination across other sectors. The commission therefore 
recommends that the MoJ should develop its overarching and strategic commissioning 
competence, and request information from NPSS which can be used by various 
decision-makers at the higher level more systematically. While this ultimately is a 
responsibility of the Ministry, the commission claims little doubt that the NPSS both 
could and should have shown greater initiative and contributed more actively to 
strengthen the MoJs ability to capitalize on the competence of the service. In addition, 
the dialogue between the two should focus more on strategic, long-term developments, 
and less on the ongoing cases and the methods of the service (Traavikutvalget, 
2012:17-18). 
 
While these findings seem to indicate that the dialogue between the MoJ and the NPSS 
is not optimal, they are somewhat contradictive to the statements of the previous chiefs 
of the NPSS. In 2012, both Jørn Holme and Janne Kristiansen emphasized that the 
contact and dialogue with the MoJ and the Minister of Justice had overall been very 
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good. Although appeals for more resources were not always heard, both leaders 
experienced that the MoJ was genuinely interested in the work of the service 
(Stortinget, 2012). 
 
The role of the MoJ 
As Deputy Director General of the Police Department at the MoJ, Knut Fosli outlines 
the scope of the work toward the NPSS. In an interview with the July 22 Commission, 
Fosli estimated around 4 full-time equivalent’s having the NPSS as its primary 
responsibility. The personnel are variously educated, but according to Fosli, the 
department has limited experience or knowledge within security policy, something 
which had been requested by the NPSS. Fosli explains that the Lund Commission-
report induced a new culture within the department - a culture where one generally 
took more distance from the NPSS. Therefore, the department did not have a tradition 
for any substantial engagement with the service. When it comes to issuing and 
discussing priorities for the focus of the service, Fosli claims that the structure of this 
arrangement is good and that the Ministry generally played a quite active role in 
frequent discussions concerning the priorities of the service. However, he notes that 
the Ministry would benefit if the service could be more open in the dialogue about 
what they were working on (Fosli, 2012:7). Fosli further states that the service 
probably would prefer if the Ministry was more actively engaged in terms of new 
developments and trends, and that it more clearly defined its preferences. However, 
this has proved difficult under a strained budget situation. This seems to indicate that 
the MoJ potentially could have been a better dialogue partner if they had more 
resources. In Fosli’s view, the ministry should ideally take a stronger role as a 
commissioner for the NPSS, as this is closely related to the government's ability to 
deal with threats and the ability to see the public interest in relation to new 
developments (Fosli, 2012:9-10). 
 
These insights are reaffirmed in several other interviews with personnel within the 
MoJ. Special Advisor and former Secretary General, Morten Ruud, recognizes the 
NPSS’ need for a proficient sparring partner and understands that the service requests 
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a more overarching, strategic perspective from the ministry. Ruud argues that this 
issue, to some extent, is a result of limited resources (Ruud, 2012:7, 10). Deputy 
Secretary General Hans O. Østgaard, who led the NPSS from 93 to 97, wishes that 
more resources were devoted to the dialogue with the NPSS, especially since the 
NPSS’ budgets and general activity has increased significantly over the past 5-7 years. 
Østgaard acknowledge that the ministry has limited contributions to offer when it 
comes to the strategic priorities of the service, and that the goals suggested by the 
NPSS in the management dialogue often remain unchanged. In this way, the service 
practically functions as self-regulating. On basis of the dialogue and threat assessments 
of the service, the Ministry each year drafts a prioritized list of tasks which the NPSS 
should perform according to budget. This is the ministry’s strategic message to the 
service, where preventive measures against terrorism for several years have been the 
main priority. Østgaard acknowledge that the NPSS might want more precise 
assignments, but notes that the ministry often finds it difficult to give precise guidance 
on general preventive measures (Østgaard, 2012:5-6). This is also reflected in 
interviews with Director General Hans Sverre Sjøvold. He explains that it is difficult 
for the ministry to manage the priorities and goals of the NPSS, and although the 
documents are developed at the ministerial level, it is in many ways the service itself 
that issues guidelines for the strategic management. Highlighting the ministry’s lack of 
professional understanding in security related issues, Sjøvold argues that a 
considerable strengthening of competence is required for the ministry to be a worthy 
sparring partner for NPSS (Sjøvold, 2012:5).  
 
Support to other parts of the government 
With regard to indicators of the ability to support decision-making within the wider 
government, the analysis has found limited and somewhat diverging evidence. Back in 
2000, Sårbarhetsutvalget highlighted that there are many governmental institutions 
which has significant needs for updated information on relevant threats and therefore 
should have easy access to related intelligence. Meanwhile, the report also noted that 
Norwegian public administration has little tradition to utilize intelligence in its 
decision making (Sårbarhetsutvalget, 2000:254). In 2012, Janne Kristiansen stated that 
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other sectors generally expressed great interest toward the threat assessments of the 
service, especially in the half-yearly gatherings of Total-defense-forum 
(Totalforsvarsforum), which is an important meeting arena for civil and military 
leaders with security and preparedness responsibilities (Kristiansen, 2012:5). Hans O. 
Østgaard describes that members of the KRU once every month held a briefing which 
opened for discussions around the threat scenario. Matters that were found relevant 
were reported to the respective ministries. According to Østgaard, the MoJ clearly has 
a responsibility to ensure that the various sectors realize the threat scenario which 
presented by the NPSS, and he explains that the ministry works actively to spread the 
public assessments around to the other ministries. However, Østgaard notes that many 
actors at this level do not seem to have knowledge of how to make use of these 
assessments (Østgaard, 2012:6-7). This is further elaborated by Director General for 
the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB), John A. Lea. He 
explains that the NPSS threat assessments are often very general in nature, which 
makes them hard to operationalize for a specific distribution of responsibilities. 
However, Lea also notes that the service has recently become more focused on how to 
produce more specific threat assessments (Lea, 2012:5).  
 
Generally, the NPSS have experienced little interest and low demand for their sector-
specific analyses, among others from the oil-sector, which according to the service has 
several vulnerabilities and should therefore be more proactive and request their 
assessment. Østgaard agrees that the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy in this relation 
could have “done more”. To him it seems that the matters which are within the 
government’s responsibility in this area are not considered urgent enough to ask for 
support from the NPSS. Therefore, it is largely left to the companies themselves to 
take measures against threats and potential espionage against their industry (Østgaard, 
2012:6-7). In September 2013, the NPSS distributed a classified report entitled 
“Extremism in Norway” via the Contact Group for the Prevention of Terrorism. The 
purpose of the report is to make municipalities, various government agencies, and 
ministries better able to protect themselves against extremism and prevent future 
terrorism. In the media, this report was largely considered to be a response to the 
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criticisms of the Traavik Commission that highlighted a lack of information to the 
wider public administration (Aftenposten, 2013b). Again, this might indicate the 
potential effect of external reviews when it comes to effectuating changes within the 
organization. 
 
On question whether he regards that the RSU, the Prime Minister and the Minister of 
Justice is close enough to the intelligence picture, Morten Ruud claims that the 
political level generally seem to be much closer on the military-side than what is 
usually the case on civilian side. In relation to the identified indicators, this suggests 
that the NPSS is not able to provide the continuous and relevant support to high-level 
decision-makers. Ruud envisages that the political level indeed could have been much 
more attendant to the NPSS than what is the case today (Ruud, 2012:7, 10). According 
to the July 22 Commission, the main challenges are related to attitudes, culture and 
leadership – shortcomings for which the MoJ should take its share of responsibility 
(22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:456). 
 
Summary 
In general, the material paints a picture of insufficient connection between the NPSS 
and the ministerial level. Even though measures were taken to strengthen connections 
during the early 2000s, the dialogue between the MoJ and the NPSS still seems to 
deficit from the necessary strategic perspective and direction. Sources within the MoJ 
suggest that the ministry, after the criticisms of the Lund Commission, developed an 
inclination to take more distance from the service. Sources within both the NPSS and 
the MoJ also indicate that the ministry deficits from the required competence and 
understanding for capitalizing on the potential of intelligence to support its objectives. 
More fundamentally, it may seem that Norway lacks the culture and tradition for 
utilizing intelligence in decision making within the wider government and public 
administration. While certain sources indicate that various decision-makers 
increasingly show interest toward the products of the service, it seems that many 
public actors do not have the necessary knowledge to make use of the products. To 
some extent, this might be related to the general nature of the products provided by the 
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service. However, sources indicate that the NPSS has recently become focused on 
producing more specific assessments. This might in turn make it easier for customers 
to operationalize and utilize these assessments in their work. Still, considerable 
progress remains for the communication and dialogue to meet the standards which is 
required between intelligence services and political decision-makers in today’s 
complex environment. 
 
Potential drivers for change 
From the material of this section it is difficult to derive specific drivers for increased 
connection and communication between intelligence and its customers. There sources 
clearly convey a need to increase the level of communication, especially with regard to 
questions of a more strategic nature. External reviews might be a potential driver for 
such an effort. In this relation, the July 22 Commission and the Traavik Commission 
have made their clear recommendations. At this point, it remains to be seen what 
might arise from these external correctives and suggestions. The latest developments 
in September 2013 might suggest that these reports have triggered certain changes 
within the organization, notably with the distribution of reports within the wider 
government. During the early 2000s, recommendations from the Danielsen Committee 
resulted in structural amendments to the relationship between the service and the 
ministry. Although these changes have not seemed to noticeably improve the 
communication, the effect of such changes should not be underestimated. Depending 
on the substance of new potential new structural amendments, such measures might 
represent a potential driver to increase the level of communication as well as the 
general appreciation of intelligence and its potential to support decision making. 
 
Potential barriers for change 
The potential barriers that can be derived from this section are not so much issues that 
exclusively concern the NPSS. Rather, knowledgeable sources indicate that Norway in 
general deficits from a strategic culture where intelligence agencies report to the top. 
The understanding of threats is therefore limited at the higher levels. This issue also 
manifests itself in a limited ability of politicians to actually define their preferences 
75 
 
and needs in a way that allows the NPSS to follow up in a relevant manner. The main 
challenges are related to attitudes, culture and leadership. Leadership begins at the top, 
and external reviews emphasize that the ministry undeniably should take its share of 
responsibility for these shortcomings. Especially noteworthy is also the statements 
emphasizing that the ministry, after the Lund Commission report, generally took more 
distance from the service. This indicates the existence of a potential adverse culture 
within the ministry which undoubtedly might represent a barrier for strengthening the 
dialogue with the NPSS. From the material it also appears that several decision-makers 
often find the process of obtaining access to intelligence to be overly complicated and 
time-consuming. In addition, certain sources explain that a stained budget situation 
might have contributed to limit the ministry’s engagement with the service.  
 
4.5.Cooperative 
 
 
Early awareness and efforts at cooperation 
Back in 1989, an external review by the Karlstad Committee stated that, in spite of 
improved relationship between the military and police intelligence services since the 
beginning of the 1970s, the need for better communication was persistent and 
substantial. However, these insights did not lead to any noteworthy improvement in 
the organization for cooperation between the services. The topic was later treated by 
the Danielsen Committee, concluding that it was essential to establish a close and 
trusted relationship between the agencies (Sårbarhetsutvalget, 2000:254, 257). After 
the events of 9/11, the US commission found major room for improvement in the 
framework for cooperation and coordination between the US intelligence agencies. 
The underlying reasoning was that, due to the dynamic and transnational nature of 
Intelligence organizations need to be properly organized for cooperation and coordination 
with other intelligence organizations, as well as with other relevant actors of government. 
 
Indicators:  
 Legal provisions and instructions for cooperation 
 Joint units 
 Joint products 
 Arrangements for cooperation with other relevant actors 
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threats, the institutional firewalls which traditionally erected between external and 
internal services now had to be broken down. Over the last decade, these wisdoms 
have been incorporated in the security framework of many western countries (Kynø, 
2007:53). In Norway, this has spawned several initiatives aimed at improving national 
security cooperation, several of them focusing especially on the cooperation between 
the NPSS and NIS specifically (Kynø, 2007:53).  
 
To ensure the cooperation between the intelligence services, the government 
established the Coordinating and Advisory Committee for the Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Security Services (KRU), operating after own Instruction adopted in 
2002 (Aftenposten, 2010). The KRU is a joint, collaborative body for the intelligence 
and security services that maintains responsibility for the overall coordination of the 
tasks, priorities and objectives of the Norwegian intelligence services. Since Norway 
had no unified priority document for the coordination between the services, the KRU 
was the body intended to monitor and ensure such coordination (Kynø, 2007:47-48). 
In addition, the KRU analyzes and examines topics associated with current threats and 
changes in the threat environment in order to capture new challenges and implement 
countermeasures. The body has a permanent secretariat and comprises representatives 
from the MoD, MoJ, and MoFA, as well as the chiefs of NIS, NPSS and NSA (EOS-
utvalget, n.d. a; Justis- og politidepartementet, 2006:47-48). Administratively, the 
KRU is subordinated the MoD and it reports there for matters concerning military 
affairs but to the MoJ in matters regarding the civil sector (Brox, 2004: 20-21). 
According to interviews conducted by Stein Fredrik Kynø in 2007, representatives 
from the MoFA and MoJ and the intelligence services found that the KRU was a well-
working support element (Kynø, 2007:47). In perspective of the indicators, the KRU 
represents one example of new entities established for the purpose of coordination and 
cooperation. 
 
New instructions and joint units 
In an effort toward a general modernization of the NPSS, the Norwegian government 
in 2005 issued new instructions for the service. These instructions are generally 
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regarded as important tools that provide a framework for the NPSS to perform its tasks 
(Justis- og politidepartementet, 2005). The 2005 instructions also issued some advices 
on how to collaborate with national and international partners, more specifically 
stating that the NPSS shall cooperate with the Police Directorate, the NIS and the 
NSA. However, the instructions gave no further details of what such cooperation 
should entail (Instruks for Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste, 2005). It was therefore highly 
relevant when the government in October 2006 adopted a separate instruction for the 
cooperation between the NPSS and the NIS, also including the NSA. This instruction 
established the preliminaries for a more formal partnership between the services for 
the analysis of threats (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2007). The statutory regulation 
specifically states that; 
 
(…) the services shall keep each other informed of developments in relevant 
technology and share other relevant information, in addition to coordinating the 
cooperation with foreign services, establishing linkage, considering exchange of 
personnel, and assisting each other in threat assessments and specific cases when the 
respective legal frameworks allows for it (Instruks om samarbeidet mellom 
Etterretningstjenesten og Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste, 2006, own translation). 
 
The aim of the instruction was to ensure that services, through their collective 
resources, could effectively capture and meet the potential threats and security 
challenges. In addition, the instruction clarifies responsibilities between the services, 
prioritized areas of collaboration, and recommendations for flow of information 
between the two (EOS-utvalget, n.d. a). According to leaders of the services, these 
instructions pointed the cooperation between the NPSS and the NIS in a positive 
direction (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012: 394). In relation to the indicators, this provides 
evidence of instructions which issue guidelines for the nature and substance of the 
cooperation between the services. 
 
With reference to the indicator of specific joint units which have been established to 
strengthen the cooperation, the government in 2008 initiated a Unit for Common 
Analysis (FAE) between the services. Although initially regarded as a three year pilot 
project, the FAE represented the first formal platform for cooperation on joint products 
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such as threat assessments and thematic reports. In the period 2008 to 2010, the unit 
developed several strategic analysis of radical Islamism, but since then, the strategic 
perspective has faded and the cooperation within the FAE has revolved more around 
operational analyses. According to the July 22 Commission, representatives of the 
agencies have also indicated that the FAE-initiative never materialized as a 
“permanent feature” (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012: 394). The project was evaluated in 
2010 and found to be mostly successful by both services. The Traavik Commission 
however, noted that the unit never seemed to find its form (Traavikutvalget, 2012:32-
33). Although sources indicate that personnel at ground level seemed to work better 
together, this was not the case higher up in the hierarchies. In his Master’s thesis in 
2011, Ketil Wilhelmsen still found an inadequate level of interaction between the 
services (Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:46; Wilhelmsen, 2011:71). 
 
Cultural differences and disagreements which hinder cooperation 
In an interview with the July 22 Commission, Janne Kristiansen explained that the 
planned evaluation of FAE was postponed several times due to disagreements between 
the MoD and MoJ. She claims that the MoD had not realized the major changes in the 
security environment since the end of the Cold War, and that the Ministry therefore 
claimed billions in order fight outdated threats while disregarding new issues such as 
extremism and terrorism. In the meetings of the KRU, both services often expressed a 
need to change the FAE, but their views did not converge on the substance of such 
change. Although the relationship with the NIS in general was very good, Kristiansen 
argues that there were significant barriers to information sharing between the services 
(Kristiansen, 2012:4-5; Stortinget, 2012).  
 
Torgeir Hagen, who led the NIS in the period 2002-2009, found the cooperation to be 
a very sensitive issue with many gray areas which required extensive discussions. 
Meanwhile, Deputy Director General of the NPSS, Roger Berg, highlights that all 
intelligence services are reluctant to share. Berg argues that this is imprinted in the 
spinal cord of the employees (Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:46). In 2009, Kristiansen 
had several meetings with the newly appointed Chief of the NIS, Kjell Grandhagen, 
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where these issues were discussed and common efforts were made in order to identify 
and address the barriers for cooperation. Kristiansen found the legal aspects as the 
biggest obstacle, but she also claims there are questions related to culture and attitudes 
(Kristiansen, 2012:4-5; Stortinget, 2012). The July 22 Commission notes that the 
different historical experiences and different regulations may indeed have contributed 
that the services have developed significantly different cultures (22. Juli-kommisjonen, 
2012:394). Arrangements such as the FAE were according to Kristiansen commonly 
dominated by different conceptions and practices, especially when it comes to sharing 
information. The NPSS found that they gave a lot but generally were offered little in 
return, thereby causing dissatisfaction within the service (Kristiansen, 2012:4-5). 
 
Competition hinders cooperation 
According to Morten Ruud at the MoJ, there seems to be, and probably always will be, 
a certain element of competition between the two services. Ruud does not elaborate 
this statement any further, but notes that competition should not necessarily be 
regarded a bad thing (Ruud, 2012:8). A competitive relationship might indeed be a 
driver for the quality of each of the services regarded separately, but when it comes to 
cooperation between them, it might have adverse implications. Investigative reporter 
and author, Kjetil Stormark, has little doubt that the relationship between the services 
is one dominated by competition. Although relations lately have improved, Stormark 
claims that the association between the NIS and the NPSS has never been particularly 
warm. Notably, Stormark argues that the competition between them has fostered a 
reluctance to share information, thus making it difficult to achieve a sound cooperative 
relationship (Stormark, 2013). Researcher Helge Lurås, having background from the 
NIS himself, elaborates this in the following terms: 
 
Here you found people who dedicated their entire career to study the internal affairs of 
one or another country. They rarely met a decision-maker, and the public could never 
get insight into what they knew and what they were doing. It was therefore 
competition for recognition in the first place. If they in addition met a dork from 
another service who worked on the exact same issues, a competitive relationship 
naturally arose (Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:45). 
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Lasse Roen argues that we must dare to talk about the competition between the 
services, because the competition clearly exists. Roen warns that the relationship must 
not become a fight for attention in a way that allows the ego of individuals to stand in 
the way of national security (Roen, 2012:49). Former Minister of Justice Odd Einar 
Dørum, says that everybody who has studied sociology understands that questions of 
competition is raised. However, Dørum claims that he followed the services closely 
and never received information of sloppy cooperation between the two (Brunmark & 
Solberg, 2012:45). Jørn Holme provides a similar account to this question, 
emphasizing that the flow of information was good and that he never experienced any 
barrier or obstructions of a competitive kind between the two organizations (Stortinget, 
2012). 
 
Although the previous and current leaders of the NPSS and the NIS seem to diverge 
slightly with regard of how the cooperation has functioned, their overall assessment 
generally lands on the positive side, highlighting major improvements in the 
relationship between the two services. Kjell Grandhagen states that the cooperation is 
better than ever before, but notes that the threat scenario in Norway has changed 
significantly over the recent years, meaning that there is continued potential for 
improving the relations between the NIS and the NPSS (Stortinget, 2012). It might 
indeed be relevant to discuss whether these are true reflections of the cooperation or 
merely a public charade of the leaders in order to silent the critical voices. As one 
internal source stated to Norwegian Newspaper Dagens Næringsliv in December 2012: 
 
Publicly we are one big happy family, but this does not match with reality (Brunmark 
& Solberg, 2012:41). 
 
The numerous attempts for actually strengthening the arrangements might also indicate 
that the cooperation has in fact not been as seamless as the public statements of the 
leaders seem to portray. This is not to say that cooperation has moved in a positive 
direction since 2001, but the external reports and assessments in the wake of 22/7 have 
highlighted a persistent and considerable room for improvement in the framework and 
practice for cooperation between the two organizations. In addition, it seems that the 
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leaders of the services generally portray a more nuanced picture of the cooperation in 
the classified documents, than what is the case in the open forum. Among others, this 
is evident in the statements and interviews given to the July 22 Commission. 
 
The impact of 22/7 
In 2010, the two services agreed on an action plan to further describe and develop their 
cooperation, herein considering possibilities of joint information gathering as well as 
circulation of expertise, knowledge and information. Considering that the services 
function on different legal bases, the NPSS in 2011 directed an inquiry to the MoJ in 
order to clarify legal interpretations for the sharing of information (22. juli-
kommisjonen, 2012: 394). Among others, the service highlighted the lack of legal 
foundations for redistributing information which gathered through coercive measures - 
an issue which according to the Traavik commission has significantly curbed the 
cooperation between the two services (Traavikutvalget, 2012:38). FAE was evaluated 
by the organizations in February 2011, and it was suggested to permanently establish 
the unit, but not on a fulltime-functioning basis (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:394). 
However, the terrorist attacks later same year gave new impetus and direction to this 
effort. In its 2012-report, the July 22 Commission suggested that the services, in their 
effort to strengthen the cooperation, should not feel restricted to the by the FAE-
model. It was argued that a more institutionalized cooperation was required, possibly 
including rotation in personnel to ensure continuous enhancement of competence at 
both organizations. In addition, the commission advised the services to consider 
whether personnel from other parts of government also should be included, in order to 
strengthen cooperation across sectors (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012: 394-395). Later, 
the Traavik Commission recommended the establishment of a permanent unit with 
responsibility of developing joint products and assessments. It was suggested that the 
unit should include staff from the NPSS, the NIS and the NSA, while other relevant 
actors should be linked to the unit through a consultation mechanism (Traavikutvalget, 
2012:7).  
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Accordingly, the services in February 2013 announced intentions to establish a new 
Joint Counter-Terrorism Center (JCTC), situated at the NPSS headquarters in Oslo. 
The announcement came whilst the services presented their first Joint Public Threat 
Assessment, which prepared cooperatively of the NPSS, the NIS and the NSA. The 
annual joint assessment is planned to be one main products of the JCTC. The 
establishment of the JCTC therefore carries considerable relevance to the indicators of 
development, representing not only a joint unit for cooperation, but furthermore a 
framework for the continuous development of joint products within the intelligence 
community. A startup date for the JCTC is not yet determined, but the government 
believes that the center will be up and running within 2013 (Aftenposten, 2013; NRK, 
2013). Again, this also illustrates that reviews of external commissions might have 
significant influence on the developments within the organization. In this case, the 
organizational change can nearly be seen as a direct consequence of the 
recommendations of the external reviews. Also interesting is the fact that neighboring 
countries and close allies, such as Sweden and Denmark, established permanent units 
which very similar to the JCTC a while ago. Although these units have faced some of 
the similar legal challenges as the Norwegian FAE, the overall assessment both in 
Sweden and Denmark is that the establishment has been successful and rewarding. 
Specifically, these joint units have improved the quality of analyses and contributed to 
break down the walls between the participating agencies (Traavikutvalget, 2012:33). 
This might suggest that good practices of close allies represent a model or standard for 
the Norwegian service to work toward, and that the successful changes in other 
countries might represent one potential driver for further development within the 
NPSS.  
 
It is currently unclear what specific mandate the JCTC will have, and how many 
employees the center will hold. According to Grete Faremo, it can initially be expected 
to hold a small number of staff, with an aim of a gradual expansion. Upon the 
announcement, Faremo would not mention any specific experiences that had led to the 
establishment of the JCTC, but stated that there had been a desire for more joint 
analyzes of the NIS and the NPSS. The objective was therefore to establish a stronger 
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formal structure for the cooperation, where personnel - rotating in from both services - 
will be situated under the same roof in order to develop a more genuine joint product. 
In addition, the center is planned to work closely with other relevant government 
actors (Aftenposten, 2013; NRK, 2013). 
 
It remains to be seen what arises from this effort. Critical observers such as Kjetil 
Stormark show limited optimism. Behind the clever name, Stormark currently finds 
little content and limited specific commitment. In his view, the JCTC so far appears to 
be nothing much but a new label for the FAE, which according to Stormark was 
dominated by competition and a reluctance to share information. He highlights that the 
outcome of the initiative needs to be founded on more than a neat name adjustment; it 
will require sound political leadership, clearer responsibilities and considerably more 
resources than before (Stormark, 2013).  
 
The Traavik Commission acknowledges that the relationship between the services 
historically has been difficult and that there still is considerable room for 
improvement. On this note, the commission argue that a more institutionalized 
cooperation on analyzes, such as the JCTC, might serve to strengthen not only the 
analytical products, but also the ties and associations between the two organizations 
(Traavikutvalget, 2012:5). 
  
Cooperation outside the intelligence community 
In an article in Aftenposten, Lasse Roen and Arvid Ellingsen also acknowledge that 
the JCTC might represent a step in the right direction. However, the authors argue that 
the center might be too narrowly composed to provide the broad support and 
coordination which is required in today’s security environment. Scenarios such as 
pandemic, natural disasters and organized crime represent only a few of the 
unconventional threats that the Norwegian government should prepare for, and these 
are risks that might affect and interfere with the entire public administration. In this 
relation, Roen and Ellingsen argue for the need of more cooperation outside the 
intelligence environment, through sharing of knowledge and expertise. Among other 
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things, the authors argue that research might provide improved methods to assess the 
threats and how they can be avoided. Research communities are standing ready 
waiting, but lack the commissioning and financing. As an example, Roen and 
Ellingsen portray that research can present reliable knowledge about the links between 
extremism and violent actions, and more fundamentally, how such attitudes can be 
prevented (Aftenposten, 2013a). 
 
Both in Norway and internationally, there has been a growing tradition for sharing 
information between intelligence agencies. However, due to the significant demands of 
confidentiality, sharing of information with actors outside the intelligence 
organizations “secret circle of trust” is more rarely seen. In this relation, the 2012 
report of the Traavik Commission states that: 
 
In the Commission’s view, the NPSS’ cooperation and interaction with other actors of 
the society has generally improved over the recent years. However, it still can and 
should be strengthened. In conversations with actors whom the NPSS cooperate with 
it appears that they consider the service little willing to share information, and that this 
may create unnecessary obstacles for the cooperation (Traavikutvalget, 2012:5). 
 
Similar insights are found in the July 22 Commission’s report, where it is emphasized 
that the service in some cases is so uncommunicative that it hinders other actors from 
contributing with their expertise and information for resolving the challenges of the 
service. On the other hand, personnel within the NPSS have expressed that they find it 
difficult to work with other actors, as much of the information is strictly classified (22. 
juli-kommijonen, 2012: 386-387). 
 
The July 22 Commission regards cross-sectorial information sharing as critical for the 
government’s ability to deal with today’s threats. More specifically, it is essential that 
other government agencies have knowledge of the NPSS’ information needs so that 
they can develop sensitivity to identify and disseminate information that is important 
for the service. The Norwegian Contact Group for the Prevention of Terrorism, which 
established in 2005, represents one effort intended to promote dialogue and 
cooperation on security threats and measures. This group was led by the NPSS, with 
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partakers from several central actors of the society including senior managers of 25 
government agencies and five industry organizations (Aftenposten, 2013b; 22. juli-
kommisjonen, 2012:387). However, the Contact Group never seemed to find its form 
and was practically dissolved in 2009. The Traavik Commission argues that structures 
like this might be an important contribution in order to clarify the different social roles 
and responsibilities of the various governmental actors (Traavikutvalget, 2012:37). 
Following 2011 and the shock of 22/7, this group have again met regularly (22. juli-
kommisjonen, 2012:387). 
 
In interview with the commission, Janne Kristiansen highlights that she earlier had 
considered an expansion of the FAE, possibly including the MoFA and other relevant 
actors. However, Kristiansen found this difficult since this was not desired of the other 
members of the FAE. She emphasize that the other members, such as the NIS, were 
concerned with the MoFA’s working methods with reference to classified information 
– a matter which, according to Kristiansen, did not distress the NPSS particularly 
(Kristiansen, 2012:13). 
 
The analysis finds little support to the indicator of cooperation with other relevant 
actors, a circumstance which seems closely related to the sensitivity and secrecy which 
naturally follows intelligence. While the secrecy of intelligence undoubtedly poses 
significant barriers for information sharing and dialogue with other actors, many 
governmental agencies are themselves also subject to extensive confidentiality 
provisions, meaning that the information they can provide the service is limited by 
law. Both commission-reports and the NPSS itself underlines that the confidentiality 
provisions raise barriers for the dialogue and information exchange with other key 
players of society (Traavikutvalget, 2012:38-39; 22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:387-
388). In order to assess whether it has the right to give up information, public actors 
often require details to why the information is requested. However, usually the NPSS 
does not have authority to provide such information, due to strict confidentiality or 
because it could harm the prevention or investigation (St. meld. nr. 21, 2012-2013:49). 
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The NPSS therefore emphasizes that the current regulations add major obstacles to 
dialogue between service and other public authorities (PST, 2012a:3).  
 
Both the July 22 Commission and the Traavik Commission recommend a thorough 
review of these provisions in order to eliminate unnecessary barriers to cooperation 
and information exchange (Traavikutvalget, 2012:38-39; 22. juli-kommisjonen, 
2012:387-388). Currently, these matters are under review by the MoJ in cooperation 
with other relevant ministries (St. meld. nr. 21, 2012-2013:49). 
 
Summary 
The material reflects an early awareness for the need of strengthening cooperation 
between the services, but developments until 2006 were patchy and provided limited 
details and formal arrangements around the substance of the cooperation. Leaders of 
the services indicate that the cooperation since 2006 has moved in a positive direction, 
notably, with the instruction for cooperation which established the preliminaries of a 
more formal partnership between the services. The FAE-initiative in 2008 resulted in 
the services developing several joint analyses, but the initiative did not seem to find its 
form, and accordingly, the FAE never materialized as a permanent feature. While 
sources indicate that personnel at ground level in later years have worked better 
together, this does not seem to be the case higher up in the hierarchies. The 
cooperation has stranded on obstacles related to legal matters, different cultures and 
diverging conceptions within the services. While the cooperation undoubtedly has 
moved in positive direction since 2001, external sources and reports still highlights a 
persistent and considerable room for improvement in the framework and practice for 
cooperation between the two organizations. In general, leaders of the services publicly 
convey a picture of significant developments in the relationship, while personnel on 
the ground level and external sources in this respect seem to be more critical. The 
aftermath of 22/7 gave new drive to the efforts toward cooperation, and based on the 
recommendations of external commissions, the services in February 2013 announced 
intentions to establish the JCTC, which among others will provide an annual joint 
assessment. Although certain observers are more critical, this study will argue that the 
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JCTC, depending on its mandate and focus, might represent a considerable step in 
right direction. This institutional setting might serve to strengthen the joint analyses 
while also contributing to break down the historically difficult relationship between 
the services. Depending on the composition of the JCTC, it might also serve to 
improve the cooperation with other relevant actors outside the intelligence 
environment. The material emphasize that, due to the significant demands of 
confidentiality, sharing of information with actors outside the intelligence environment 
has so far generally been a troublesome matter. 
 
Potential drivers for change 
The analysis reveals that the evolvements in the threat environment, with emergence 
of new, complex and transnational threats, have been a key drivers for cooperation 
between the Norwegian intelligence services. After the 9/11-attacks, the US-
commission emphasized these issues and highlighted the need to take effective 
measures to secure cooperation. This indicates that crises such as 9/11 and external 
reviews and recommendations are important drivers toward change. This is also 
supported in the Norwegian case, where the analysis reveals considerable progress in 
the aftermath of the attacks of 22/7. In similar to the case of 9/11, recommendations of 
the external commissions seem to have contributed significantly in this effort. Notably, 
the suggestions of both the July 22 Commission and the Traavik Commission are 
largely reflected in the planned establishment of the JCTC, indicating that external 
input has been an important catalyst for development. In addition, several sources 
indicate that evaluations of arrangements and practices in neighboring countries, such 
as Sweden and Denmark, might have provided guidelines and direction for this effort. 
 
Potential barriers for change 
The analysis has found several potential barriers for developing the required level of 
cooperation within and outside the intelligence community. According to the material 
the most central issues are related to different cultures and conceptions within the 
various services, the competition between them, and ambiguities in the legal 
framework for sharing of information. Both external and internal sources indicate that 
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the services have developed significantly different cultures and that their conceptions 
of threats and how to best manage them does not always converge. These issues seem 
especially pertinent at the level of management and at the ministerial level. More 
specifically, it appears that the services have developed different conceptions of 
information sharing, and that the flow between them is therefore not optimal. In this 
relation, several sources emphasize that there might have developed a competitive 
relationship which hinders cooperation between the services. To some extent, this 
might follow from the fact that the services are highly specialized and isolated 
organizations. Furthermore, considering that the services function on different legal 
bases, the analysis finds indications of legal ambiguities, which to some extent might 
have curbed the cooperation. 
 
Concerning the cooperation with actors outside the intelligence environment, sources 
within the NPSS have emphasized that they find such cooperation difficult as much of 
the information they manage is strictly classified. This is largely confirmed by external 
sources that generally perceive the service to be little communicative. Similarly, 
confidentiality provisions within the wider public administration means that the 
information other actors can provide the service is often limited by law. It thus appears 
that confidentiality related issues remain one central barrier for an appropriate 
dialogue between the NPSS and actors outside the intelligence environment. 
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Chapter V: Conclusions 
The end of the Cold War and the period following the attacks of 9/11 carried 
significant implications for western intelligence. Major developments such as 
globalization have spawned an increasingly complex security environment, while new 
perspectives on security imply that the role and requirements for intelligence 
organizations have been vastly expanded. This case study set out to assess how the 
Norwegian Police Security Service has responded to the changes in the security 
environment under this period, and to explore possible explanations for change or 
continuity within the organization. Based on insights within the academic field of 
intelligence, the study identified 5 specific requirements for the organization of 
modern intelligence services; multidisciplinary, proactive, open and transparent, 
accessible, and cooperative. 
 
5.1.Developments 
In general the analysis indicates a high level of awareness both within and outside the 
NPSS for the need to adapt according to the identified requirements. In terms of 
developments, it is found that the organization has made significant and relevant 
progress in some areas, while other parts will require continued and considerable 
efforts in order to meet the identified requirements. The most noteworthy 
developments are seen in the efforts for achieving the required level of 
multidisciplinary expertize and the appropriate amount of openness and transparency. 
From being exclusively a police organization, the NPSS has over the last decade 
moved significantly toward becoming a fundamentally multidisciplinary “knowledge 
organization”. Although a continued effort is required for developing the necessary 
level of broad competence, the analysis demonstrates that recruitment today takes a far 
more active and broader formula, resulting that the service nearly doubled its number 
of educated specialists in the period 2002-2011. Therefore, this study would argue that 
this is one area where the service has advanced much during the period under study. 
Although the analysis underlines that intelligence and openness is a relationship 
riddled with contradictions and difficult considerations, this is also one of the areas 
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where the study finds that most significant progress has been made. Over the last 
decade, the service has shown an increased and considerable will to be more open 
about its assessments, activities, and general contribution toward safeguarding vital 
national interests. Noteworthy developments in this relation include the release of 
public threat assessments, the presence in social media, and a growing number of 
public appearances from leaders and representatives of the service.  
 
In relation to the remaining three requirements, the analysis has found that 
developments have been unsatisfactory. Although the analysis revealed an internal 
awareness of the need to be more proactive and focus on strategic trends and root 
causes of threats, both internal and external sources indicate that the service has not 
managed to adapt sufficiently in relation to this requirement. More specifically, the 
findings demonstrate that scarce leadership, unbalanced priorities and unproductive 
cultures has resulted that the NPSS has not been able to devote enough attention to the 
strategic picture and potential new and emerging threats. Certain legal ambiguities 
needs to be clarified, and in certain areas, authorities might need to be expanded, but 
generally it seems that the service has not managed to seize upon the potential of its 
existing regulatory framework to achieve the proactive formula required in today’s 
threat environment.  
 
The study has also found that the services and the political level have not managed to 
achieve the close and communicative dialogue which is needed to secure the right 
priorities of the service and the relevant support to decision-makers. The dialogue 
between the NPSS and the MoJ largely deficits from strategic perspective and 
direction, and the connection with other actors within the wider government is found 
to be marginal. More fundamentally, the analysis indicates that Norway lacks the 
strategic culture and tradition for utilizing intelligence for decision making within the 
wider government and public administration.  
 
With regard to the NPSS’ ability to cooperate with actors within and outside the 
intelligence community, the analysis has found that the association with the NIS has 
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developed under slow momentum. Over the last decade, several initiatives reflect an 
understanding of the need to strengthen the cooperation between the services. Leaders 
of both the NPSS and the NIS indicate that the cooperation since 2006 has moved in a 
positive direction, notably, with the instruction for cooperation in 2006 and the FAE-
initiative in 2008. Still, internal sources and external reviews have highlighted that 
enduring issues related to culture, competition and different conceptions have resulted 
in these initiatives not materializing in any extensive cooperation. Furthermore, due to 
the extensive secrecy of intelligence and confidentiality provisions within the wider 
public administration, cooperation with other actors outside the intelligence 
community is today insufficient.  
 
This study argues that the planned establishment of the JCTC, depending on 
composition, mandate and focus, might be a considerable step in right direction. This 
institutional framework might not only contribute to strengthen joint analyses and 
break down some of the walls within the intelligence community, but might also serve 
to improve the cooperation with other relevant actors outside the intelligence 
organizations circle of thrust. 
 
5.2.Identified drivers and barriers 
The study has revealed a number of potential drivers and barriers for change within the 
NPSS. Several of these mechanisms appear to be both interrelated and self-reinforcing. 
 
With regard to potential drivers, three recurring mechanisms seem to be especially 
relevant for explaining change within the organization. Firstly, the analysis indicates 
that the security environment, and more specifically the changes in the threat scenario, 
is one central driver for change within the organization. In this relation it is 
furthermore identified that shocks or crises, such as 9/11 or 22/7 might provide further 
thrust and urgency to the efforts, resulting that determined measures are taken. 
Secondly and partly related to the previous driver, the analysis asserts that external 
correctives from commissions or other advisory bodies may be highly influential for 
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the direction and development of the organization. Strong indications are found for 
this in the implementation of the recommendations of the Danielsen Committee as 
well as in the follow up of the reports from the July 22 Commission and the Traavik 
Commission. This mechanism can also be seen in the influence of the media which 
constantly challenges the organization to change, especially relevant for the case of 
increased openness and transparency. Thirdly, leadership and determined efforts from 
the top of the organization are recurring factors in those instances where considerable 
change has succeeded. Considering that the NPSS, compared to other public actors, is 
a closed organization, sound and rational leadership from the top seems to be one 
highly important factor in order to effectuate substantial changes. In addition the 
analysis also indicates that organizational structure, amendments in the legal 
framework, and the examples set of other countries are factors which potentially might 
drive and provide further inclination toward change within the organization. 
 
The analysis has found several potential barriers for change within the NPSS. The 
most central seem to be related to the fact that the NPSS is a restricted organization 
with high demands for confidentiality. This implies that the NPSS, in contrast to other 
public organizations, is not subject to the same correctives and continuous evaluation 
from the society and therefore, the organization develops largely under its own 
momentum. This carries several adverse implications. Firstly, the analysis indicates 
that the culture within the service in general has become too bound to traditions or 
path dependent, meaning that the decisions made in the past to a great extent 
influences current decisions, even though past circumstances are no longer relevant. 
Although this might create stability in the organization, it also significantly reduces the 
ability to adapt quickly in accordance with the environment, an outcome which clearly 
is evident in the analysis. Secondly, managing change within such closed 
organizations presumes strong leadership. In this relation, the analysis finds that the 
NPSS is lacking the required strategic leadership to define the direction and focus of 
the organization. This accounts largely for leadership at various levels within the 
organization, but it is also reflected in the dialogue with the MoJ, which is the NPSS’ 
main external sparring partner. When leaders are not able to clearly point out the 
93 
 
strategic direction of the service this can, among other, result in the emergence of 
potentially unhealthy subcultures where the narrow interests of single individuals or 
departments are given preference to define the focus and pathway of the organization. 
In case of the NPSS, this seem to have resulted that too little attention is offered to the 
overarching goals and objectives which are relevant in relation to the security 
environment the NPSS operates within. Thirdly, the high demands for confidentiality 
within the organization results that the NPSS often either is unable or unwilling to 
share information with others. Clearly, there are certain limits to how open and 
transparent the organization can be toward the society. However, the analysis also 
indicates that this presents significant barriers for the cooperation with other actors 
both within and outside the intelligence community. In the relationship with the NIS, 
different cultures and competition between the services might also have contributed 
that the communication between them is insufficient. 
 
In addition to these more overarching issues, the analysis also indicates that there are 
possible challenges for development embedded in the legal framework and in the 
strong monitoring from the EOS Committee. It is common knowledge that the 
development of society often will lie ahead of the laws governing it. In this relation it 
seems that regulatory issues to some extent might have hindered the sufficient 
developments, especially in areas such as the Internet. 
 
5.3.Suggestions for further research 
Finally, this exploratory study was meant to be exactly that – exploratory. Therefore it 
is appropriate to highlight some interesting topics and issues for future research.  
 
The study has identified several potential drivers and barriers for change within the 
NPSS, and undoubtedly this is a highly interesting topic for further study. Considering 
the many intelligence organizations carry some of the same inherent characteristics 
with regard to secrecy, lack of external correctives and high degree of specialization, a 
more comprehensive study of these key mechanisms might potentially achieve high 
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external validity and therefore have value beyond the specific case or cases under 
study. 
 
Such research might in example consider how various parameters within intelligence 
organizations – structure, culture, decision processes – might affect the general 
capacity for change and development within such organization. Organizational theory 
suggests that such parameters might have significant effects on the organizations 
ability to adapt. For instance, organizational theory emphasize that organizations with 
formalized and function based working processes as well as centralized procedures for 
decision making are often less adaptive than more dynamic and decentralized 
organizations (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2007:90-94). This is also evident in the case of 
this study where the function-based structure and high degree of specialization within 
the NPSS might have produced certain adverse sub-cultures. In this case, the culture 
might be described as “department egoism”, resulting that various departments are 
little aligned with reference to the further development of the organization (Jacobsen 
& Thorsvik, 2007:63, 69). 
 
Another highly interesting point of departure for a study would be to utilize 
organizational theory and its acknowledged perspectives for explaining organizational 
change, such as the rational, institutional or neo-institutional perspectives. These 
theories provide three distinct ways of looking upon change within organizations. 
Within the rational perspective, change is based on the assumption of intentionality in 
the sense that changes are aligned towards clearly defined goals and objectives. These 
are defined by the management which realizes the need to change the organization. 
Such top-down approach, where leaders recognize a need for change and take action 
accordingly, is indicated in several of the efforts within the NPSS. The analysis 
indicates that rational and determined efforts of leadership can be regarded one of the 
central drivers for change within the NPSS. The institutional perspective on the other 
hand, is often described as a counterpart to the rational perspective. Through this 
perspective, changes are usually considered a natural development process in which 
the organization gradually adapts to its internal and external environment. Here, 
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changes can be interpreted as time-consuming processes in which culture is one central 
focus for the process of change. From the analysis of this study it appears clear that 
cultures within the NPSS means that the organization in some areas is resistant to 
demands for rapid and comprehensive changes. Several sections of the analysis 
highlight internal resistance toward the efforts of change, which through the 
institutional perspective would be described as an integral inertia of the organization. 
Meanwhile, the neo-institutional perspective targets the relationship between the 
organization and its environment. The key question is how the organization is affected 
and influenced by pressure and therefore effectuates changes that are accepted in the 
surroundings. The expectations from the environment imply that the organization must 
adhere to norms of organizational design, and attempt to incorporate and reflect these 
norms outwards, even though they do not necessarily make the organization more 
efficient. From the analysis of this study, it is found that the change toward more 
openness and transparency clearly can be considered a result of new demands, values 
and norms in the environment (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2007:156-161). 
 
Intuitively, one can see that all of these perspectives might have exploratory power for 
the case of this study. This indicates that a more systematic study by means of these 
theories might yield valuable insights for how to understand and explain 
organizational change or continuity within intelligence organizations. A more 
thorough examination like this would however likely require a more extensive source 
material than what could be acquired for this study, for example through in-depth 
interviews. In addition, such examinations might benefit from including a comparative 
element - to other countries or model examples. This researcher finds that a study of 
the Norwegian case compared to the approaches in Sweden, Denmark or the UK could 
potentially yield valuable findings. 
 
Whichever topic catches attention of other researchers, this exploratory research has 
clearly underlined that the demands for change in relation to intelligence organizations 
are significant. The post-Cold War era carried new threats and challenges, new 
technology, and new demands from the society, meaning that intelligence 
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organizations continuously need to develop its capacity to adapt accordingly. In this 
relation, this study as well as potential future research on the topic might provide 
critical insights for the organizations ability to manage change and navigate an 
increasingly turbulent landscape. 
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